Abraham, Smasher of Idols, and the Question of the Torah’s Historicity

Does Abraham really need to be historical in order to claim an important role in Jewish religious consciousness? Should the Torah be seen as a historical account reported by God, or simply as the story of God?

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Abraham, Smasher of Idols, and the Question of the Torah’s Historicity

Abraham destroys his father Terah’s idols, Herlingen Haggadah, Vienna, 1725, f. 4v (detail). e-codices

Published: February 12, 2014

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Last Updated: September 7, 2026

  1. Many commentaries throughout the generations have taken up this question; see, for example, Ramban on Genesis 11:28 and Maharal of Prague in Netzah Yisrael, ch. 11, p. 68.

  2.  For a discussion of the phenomenon of ‘filling the gaps’ – see Yonah Frankel, Midrash ve-Aggada, (5753), 41 [Hebrew].

  3.  See the long discussion in Responsa Rashba (1:414), where Rashba uses strong language to criticize various sages who suggested a philosophical-allegorical understanding for a number of biblical characters, including Abraham. However, see the words of Maimonides about Adam, Eve and the serpent in Guide of the Perplexed (2:30). See also the words of Maharal of Prague about Abraham and Sarah in his Glosses on Aggadot (part 3, p. 83), but compare these with his comments in Gevurot Hashem (ch. 41).

  4.  There is a third as well, which I deal with in my book, in a later chapter.

  5.  A lot has been written about the principle of ‘the slippery slope.’ See, for example, the essay by Yuval Cherlow, “Halacha and the Slippery Slope,” Akdamut 23 (5769): 33-48 [Hebrew].

  6.  In my book, I deal with this in chapter 4.

  7.  Doubtless, this claim reveals an important educational principle whose significance is beyond reproach. It is one that any person who wishes to renew his or her faith—perhaps even to limit its horizons for a time—should take to heart. 

  8.  In fact, see Responsa Rashba 1:116, where Rashba makes this point. For another angle on the problem of ahistorical interpretation, made in modern times, see words of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the Lubavitcher Rebbe (Iggerot Kodesh 7:996):

    The Torah’s conception is clear, that one of the reasons for the commandment to rest on the seventh day of every week is because ‘for six days God created the heavens and the earth and on the seventh day he stopped and rested’ (Exod. 31:17). From this, it is clear that the six days of creation refer to six actual days, not, as some want to claim, to six periods of time.
  9.  We will leave, for now, the difficult questions engendered by the issue of the slippery slope and return to them indirectly when we deal with the other basis for challenging the ahistorical interpretation, namely the problem of “truth.” Additionally, the slippery slope problem is discussed more fully in chapter 4 of my book, which deals with the historicity of a different biblical story, namely the revelation at Mount Sinai. 

  10.  In my opinion, which is based on multiple encounters with a number of different groups, this critique can be found at the heart of many people’s objections to ahistorical reading of the Torah, and feeds their intuitive rejection of this paradigm. Furthermore, this objection often remains inchoate and not fully articulated. To me, it seems likely that the par between those who criticize the ahistorical paradigm and those who embrace it can be traced to the par between the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth, but a full analysis along these lines would take us too far afield.

  11.  It is virtually impossible to exaggerate the political, sociological and emotional implications of this assertion. This can be seen clearly in the rich collection of essays, edited by Lee Levin and Amichai Mazer, The Polemic about the Historical Truth of Scripture(Jerusalem, 5761) [Hebrew]. Although the book focuses on a period of time later than that discussed here—the period of David and Solomon—nevertheless, the rhetorical force of the essays that express reservations similar to that expressed above—essays that come from very different scholars—demonstrates the tangible reality of the emotional power that stands behind the “truth problem.” I must admit that I could not personally identify with any of the (admittedly thoughtful) analyses in that collection, and this is probably due to my own alternative way of thinking about this problem, as described in this essay.

  12.  In this case, it isn’t about writing per se, as it makes little difference whether it is reported by radio, TV, or newspaper.

  13.  Even if its conclusions will, in the end, be rejected—not always and not necessarily—by practical halacha.

  14.  M. Pesachim 10:5. Over the years, the interpretive tradition has taken this statement far out of its original meaning, which refers to the way a person is to behave on the night of the 15th of Nissan, and turned it into a key phrase describing Jewish consciousness in general. On its own, the sentence can be understood as conveying the opposite meaning, as a call for those involved in studying the exodus from Egypt to remove themselves from the present, to transport themselves through time and view the event the way it would have been viewed by Moses and Aaron, Datan and Abiram. This understanding is reminiscent of the approach of Peter Winch, which requires a historian to enter into the past and to view it from within. Nevertheless, the Sages’ statement can be seen in conjunction with other statements of theirs, which are close in spirit to the interpretation offered in this essay (for example, the statement in the Haggada of Pesach that “in every generation people stand against us to destroy us.”) These statements were expanded upon and intensified in Hasidic thought. See, for example, the Gerrer Rebbe, R. Yehudah Aryeh Leib Alter (Sefat Emet on Leviticus, Pesach 5631): “In every generation there is an exodus from Egypt, but one relevant to that generation.” There is much more to say about this, but here is not the place.  

  15.  With regard to the sciatic nerve, the Mishna states (m. Chullin 7:6): “The rule applies to clean animals but not to unclean ones. Rabbi Yehudah said: ‘It applies even to unclean animals.’ Rabbi Yehudah said to them: ‘But wasn’t the sciatic nerve forbidden to the sons of Jacob, and they were permitted to eat unclean animals!’ They said to him: ‘The law was stated at Sinai but was included in its proper place.’” For a summary of the issues surrounding pre-Sinaitic rules, see the entry in the Encylopedia Talmudit, “One may not learn [rules] from the time before the giving of the Torah,” (vol. 1, pp. 635-637 [Hebrew]).

  16.  Whether one must take the account of the Sinai revelation as historical or not is dealt with in chapter 4 of my book. 

  17.  There are those who point out that it is precisely if one assumes that Torah relates historical events that comparison with similar accounts in the Ancient Near East make sense. For it is hardly surprising that events that occurred in history would be recorded in the writings of various cultures that witnessed these events. Conversely, if the Torah is only telling stories, it would appear, at first glance, more difficult to account for the similarities between its stories and those of the surrounding cultures. This claim, however, can be countered by making recourse to the premise of comparative literature, where it is one and the same whether a given story has a historical basis or not: comparison between texts always offers useful and challenging insights. Take the flood story, for example. The Torah tells the story in a certain way, and other traditions tell it in different ways. A comparison between the various tellings allows us to clarify the core values the come through in each text, and, consequently, to characterize with more clarity the meaning with which the scriptural Author meant to imbue the story (a claim made above as well.) Is it somehow illegitimate that the scriptural Author would retell a version of a popular story and include it within the broader narrative, and, with tremendous creativity, recast the story anew according to God’s own principles. A similar point was made by R. Abraham Kook in Eder ha-Yakkar, (Jerusalem, 5726), p. 42.     

  18.  It must be admitted that the long genealogical lists, which specify the origins of the entire human species (see, for instance, Gen. 4:18-5:32), stand in some tension with the above-offered claim. What are they if not dry historical descriptions? However, see Rambam’s comments in The Guide of the Perplexed (3:50) as well as chapter 5 of my book. My thanks to Hillel ben-Sasson for sharpening this point.     

  19.  In The Guide of the Perplexed (3:31), Rambam sharply criticizes people who believe that it would be best not to ascribe positive human characteristics to God. (For instance, not to say that God uses rational and beneficent thinking. Rambam, in contrast, uses this claim to explain why God commanded humans to act in certain ways and forbids them to act in others.) Rambam’s approach here applies to our case as well. Thus, we can say that there is no reason not to ascribe great literary prowess to God.

  20.  For more discussion on this question, see the position of R. Mordechai Breuer as he expressed it first in De’ot 12 (Winter 5720): pp. 12-26 [Hebrew] and afterwards in his book.Pirkei Moadot (Jerusalem, 5746), p. 22 [Hebrew]. For an English version explaining Breuer’s approach, see: Mordechai Breuer, “The Study of Bible and the Primacy of the Fear of Heaven: Compatibility or Contradiction,” in Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah (ed. Shalom Carmy; Orthodox Forum; Northvale: Aaronson, 1996), 159-180. For an overall discussion of his approach by other scholars, see: Yosef Ofer (ed.), Shitat ha-Beḥinot shel ha-Rav Mordechai Breuer: Qovetz Ma’amarim u-Teguvot (Alon Shevut: Tevunot, 2005). 

  21.  An ant and an elephant are running through the desert. The ant says to the elephant, “Just look at the dust-clouds we’re making!”

  22.  This distinction is similar to that of Achad Ha-Am between historical truth (the way a group relates to events from its past, what we now call cultural memory or mnemohistory) and archaeological truth (what actually happened in the past.) See: The Complete Works of Achad Ha-Am (Tel Aviv, 1947), p. 342 [Hebrew].

  23.  My view here stands in stark contrast with that of Rav Kook, who criticizes the ahistorical approach to biblical narratives. In his view, such an approach implies a weakness of faith and a deviation from the authentic approach of the Jewish tradition. See, Iggrot Ra’ayah vol. 1, pp. 48-49 [Hebrew]. Nevertheless, see his comment further on in the piece, “The words of aggada, which can have such good and blessed effects… are literally the words of the living God.” This statement seems to be very much in accord with what I called the highest level of faith, the belief in the ahistoricity of the narrative. To me, the key question is whether one’s approach to exploring the ahistoricity of the narrative is in order to reduce the vital importance of the Torah and its message or whether it is the opposite, to increase it, as I suggest above.

  24.  See, for example, Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher Silberman, The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology’s New Vision of Ancient Israel and the Origin of its Sacred Texts (Touchstone, 2002). There have been responses that take a more conservative approach; see, for instance, Adam Zertal, A Nation is Born: The Altar on Mount Ebal and the Beginning of Israel (Israel: Yedioth Aharonot, 2000), 292 [Hebrew]; Yitzhak Meitlis, Excavating the Bible: New Archaeological Evidence for the Historical Reliability of Scripture (Bartleby, 2012). My suggestion avoids this problem altogether.

  25.  This imagery comes from Rav Kook. See Iggrot Ra’ayah vol. 1, p. 164:

    Herein lies an important principle when it comes to wars of ideas. Anytime a particular perspective threatens to contradict something in the Torah, our first response should not be to try to disprove this idea. Rather we should try to build the palace of the Torah higher up. Thus, we ourselves are uplifted with it.

    Tamar Ross makes great use of this principle, primarily in dealing with the feminist critique of Torah. See: Tamar Ross, Expanding the Palace of Torah: Orthodoxy and Feminism(Waltham: Brandeis, 2004). Rav Kook, in his analysis of this approach, found that Rambam made use of it as he wrestled with Aristotle’s notion of an eternal universe. Rav Kook believed that this model should be copied when wrestling with notions that were current in his day, like the theory of evolution. Regarding this, see Pinkasei Ha-Ra’ayah vol. 1, 14:53, p. 163.

  26.  It would be wrong to simplify the dichotomy by trying to distinguish between “the simple person,” who would wish to hide from contradictions since answering them would be beyond this person’s ability, and “the learned person,” who, ostensibly, can deal with such tensions. This is a false dichotomy. Intuitive attachment to our inherited traditions is common to all people, regardless of education. The image of Abraham smashing idols in his father’s store and blaming it on the god is likely to bring a smile to the lips of any person who is familiar with the story from his or her childhood. This is true even for a person who can digest the nuances of the ahistorical approach to the Torah. Even for such a person, something still lingers from the dissonance required in reframing the story as ahistorical. In my book, I explore a middle position that distinguishes between cases where it is necessary to free ourselves from a historicity that strangles the spirit of the text and cases where the historicity of the story would actually make the spirit of the story that much brighter.      

  27.  See Rambam, Mishneh Torah, “Laws of Repentence,” 3:7. See also Ravad’s comment ad loc. I discuss this halacha in greater detail in the book.

  28.  Rambam himself understood that this was the way his opponents conceptualized the issue. See: The Guide of the Perplexed, 1:1.

  29.  Continuing on with the example from Rambam with which we began: stating that God lacks any body means that God is not constrained by any physical limitation. Thus, such a God can be greater than any image of a god based upon said God’s great size and dimensions as envisioned by those who assume that God is physical.