President Reuven Rivlin at the Israeli rabbinic high court’s swearing in ceremony. 2016
Civil Laws from Sinai
The religiosity of civil law and the obligation to use only Jewish courts: Rashi’s fourfold homily on Exodus 21:1.
Published: February 22, 2017
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Last Updated: September 7, 2026
Editor’s note: For more on the Holiness legislation, see Israel Knohl, “The Concept of Kedusha (Sanctity),” TheTorah.com, 2014, and Uzi Weingarten, “Not Signing Off on Sacrifices” TheTorah.com, 2015.
The midrashist is likely trying to connect the phrase “his words” in psalms to the phrase “the words” in Exod 20:1, but instead uses the rabbinic plural דברות instead of the Torah’s plural דברים.
Abraham Joshua Heschel discusses an alternative form of this midrash and its implications, in his Heavenly Torah as Reflected through the Generations (ed. and transl. Gordon Tucker; NY, Continuum: 2005), 271-2.
b. Berakhot 6a.
Stated in the midrash itself.—that is why they are HIS laws.
Editor’s note: For more on juxtaposition in rabbinic midrash, see Isaac Gottlieb’s TABS essay, “Why the Nazirite Laws Follow Those of Sotah: The Concept of Juxtaposition (סמיכות פרשיות).”
Rashi’s two glosses on the verse, taken from two different sources, are, at first glance, essentially unrelated. The first explains the grammatical opening of the verse by tyingMishpatim into the Decalogue. The second explains why Parashat Mishpatim follows the final laws of Parashat Yitro, which are not about the Decalogue but about the building of the altar. The first is about the authority of the laws in Mishpatim, that they are from God at Sinai, and the second about the connection between the judges, who will monitor the Israelite’s ethical behavior, and the altar, upon which priests will offer sacrifices to Israel’s God. Rashi connected them for a reason as I point out further in this piece.
This imagery of laws laid out like food on a table is what inspired the name of R. Joseph Karo’s famous work of halakha:
וקראתי שם ספר זה “שלחן ערוך”, כי בו ימצא ההוגה כל מיני מטעמים ערוכים בכל ושמורים סדורים וברורים.
The demonstrative “ve’elah” (and these are…) might suggest that litigation involving matters not found in the Torah might be adjudicated by non-Jews. Rashi’s inclusion of Deut 32:3 precludes such an approach.
See Maimonides Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 26:7, Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 26:1. For a comprehensive overview of this halakha, including a discussion about which aspects may be applicable in modern times and which not, see Simcha Krauss “Litigation in Secular Courts”, Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, Vol. III (1982).
There is such a law in the Talmud, see, b. Sanhedrin 59b and b. Chagigah 13a. In modern times, religious scholars of Jewish Studies rely on the responsum of R. Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg (1884-1966) in his Seridei Eish (2:55-56), who says that the prohibition only applies to gentiles trying to use the material for religious purposes, but just sharing information, such as in college courses or public lectures for the intellectually curious, is permitted.