Relating Truthfully to Morally Problematic Torah Texts

Morally problematic halachot remain on the books despite rabbinic attempts to transform or reinterpret them. How do we relate to these texts as Torah from Sinai, coming from God?

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Relating Truthfully to Morally Problematic Torah Texts

Decorated initial-word panels: on f.11 two citations from Deuteronomy 1:5 and 4:44, on f. 12, the beginning of Maimonides’ introduction to his Mishneh Torah with a citation from Psalms  119:6. Image taken from Lisbon Mishneh Torah, 1450 – 1474. British Library Harley Collection

Published: January 24, 2017

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Last Updated: September 7, 2026

  1. For another reflection on morally problematic texts, focusing especially on Psalm 137:9, see my symposium piece, “A Microcosm of an Imperfect Bible.”

  2. Rabbinic interpretation softens this by assuming the woman is betrothed and thus the sin is extramarital (Rashi ad loc.), and that the testimony against her includes witnesses to her adultery (Sifrei Devarim 239). I don’t know if the modern reader would see this as much of a consolation.

  3.  Compare Avoda Zara 10:1, 2, and 6.  Rambam is merely codifying Talmudic rulings.

  4. See discussion in Alexander Kaye, “Eliezer Goldman and the Origins of Meta-Halacha,” Modern Judaism 34.3 (2014): 309-333.

  5. See also, j. Demai 4:2; b. Eruvin 81a; Yoma 12b; 73a; Megilla 9b; Ketubot47a; 58b; 81b; Qiddushin 63a; Bava Qama 102b; Horayot 12b.

  6. אין ממחין ביד עניי גוים בלקט שכחה ופאה מפני דרכי שלום

  7. ושואלין בשלומן מפני דרכי שלום

  8. אין פודין את השבויים יותר על כדי דמיהן מפני תקון העולם ואין מבריחין את השבויין מפני תקון העולם רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר מפני תקנת השבויין

  9. See Prov 3:17.

  10. See also, b. Yevamot 87b; Nedarim 62a; Gittin 59b; j. Eruvin 3:2 (20d); 7:9 (24d).

  11. For a different example, see: e.g. b. Yevamot 79a;

  12. Isser Yehuda Unterman, דרכי שלום והגדרתם, in Qol Torah, Nisan 5726 (1966), section 4.  (My translation from Hebrew.)

  13. Hartman refers here to the commentary on the Yoreh Deah section of the Shulchan Arukh called Siftei Kohen and popularly referred to by the acronym Sha”kh. It was written by R. Shabbatai Ha-Kohen (1621-1662), and it is the bread and butter of the study of halacha in any Orthodox rabbinical school.

  14. These extracts were taken from a poor, “lightly edited” transcript of an address. I made some minor corrections. Hartman had already developed similar ideas in Joy and Responsibility: Israel, Modernity, and the Renewal of Judaism (Jerusalem: Posner, 1978) and in Conflicting Visions: Spiritual Possibilities of Modern Israel (New York: Schocken Books, 1990).

  15. Editor’s note: For more on the meaning of Torah from Sinai in rabbinic literature, see Yoseif Bloch’s TABS essay, “Trusting in the Process of Torah mi-Sinai.” See also Zev Farber’s TABS essay on the meaning of “the giving of the Torah” in rabbinic literature, “In What Way Is Shavuot Zman Matan Torateinu?”

  16. The two essays I have in mind are Lichtenstein’s “Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic independent of Halakha?, in Marvin Fox (ed.) Modern Jewish Ethics: Theory and Practice (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975), 102-23, and Borowitz, “The Authority of the Ethical Impulse in Halakha,” reprinted in Eugene B. Borowitz, Exploring Jewish Ethics: Papers on Covenantal Responsibility (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990), 193-203. These were discussed by the late Gillian Rose, in her Judaism and Modernity(Oxford UK and Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1993), reviewed by me in “Judaism and Modernity: the Whole Agenda,” in Jewish Journal of Sociology 36/2 (December 1994), 119-132.

  17. As the use of the terms “myth” and “metaphor” in English is not consistent, let me explain what I have in mind when I distinguish the two terms. A metaphor is a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable. If I talk about “the march of progress,” nobody infers that progress has legs, but they get my meaning more easily than if I had struggled to explain myself in abstract terms. Of course, much religious language is like that. Tomorrow I may talk about “the arrow of progress” – I will not be accused of inconsistency. A myth, however, is a traditional story, especially one concerning the early history of a people or explaining some natural or social phenomenon; often, it involves supernatural beings and/or events.

  18. To illustrate the difference between saying something is a metaphor or a myth, take the claim that, “God entered into a covenant with the people of Israel by giving them the Torah.” This claim is a myth in the fullest sense. It uses the metaphor of a book, or a document, or some other form of agreement. Or to be more accurate, it uses language which, depending on the belief system of the one who tells or hears the story, may be construed as metaphor, even though another teller or hearer might take it literally (e.g. the “document” is the Written Torah).