In the Footsteps of Leibowitz: Kasher, Levinger, Goldman and Schwartz

[1] As opposed to Leibowitz’s extreme theocentricim, Goldman is prepared to relegate some role to human experience in the religious life. This is exhibited firstly in his willingness to grant believers the right to attribute reasons for various mitzvot, even though such speculations bear no influence on their formal status as binding – see E. Goldman, “Scientific statements and religious statements”, Mehkarim ve-Iyunim: Hagut Yehudit be-avar uba-hoveh, edited by Danny Statman and Avi Sagi, (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1997), p. 344. Secondly, Goldman sees in the very observance of mitzvot expression of man’s belief that in the performance of such acts he is indeed worshipping God.  What this means, in effect, is that the experience of God’s presence itself, and not merely the decision to seek it, is created from within and by means of religious practice, thereby reinforcing conviction of our ability to engage with an existing metaphysical reality. The strength of this conviction stands in direct proportion to the ability of the community of believers to find experiential value in their religious practice, while constantly refraining from inappropriate metaphysical conclusions. – idem, Yahadut lelo Ashlaya, edited by Danny Statman and Avi Sagi (Jerusalem: Machon Hartman/Keter, 2009), chapters 4-5, pp. 366-368.

[2]  See Barukh Yaakov Schwartz, “Matan Torah: The Contribution of Biblical Scholarship to an Understanding of this Concept in the Past and Present” (Heb.), Mahshevet Yisrael vi-Emunat Yisrael, edited by Daniel Lasker (Beersheva: Ben Gurion University Press, 2012), pp. 30-31, suggesting that belief in the Sinaitic revelation is a by-product rather than basis for commitment to the halakhic way of life.. See also Perry Dane, “The Yoke of Heaven, the Question of Sinai, and the Life of Law”, 44 University of Toronto Law Journal, 353, 1994, pp. 353-400, where he argues that belief or disbelief in a literal revelation at Sinai is neither necessary nor sufficient to either accepting or rejecting traditional halakhic commitment. Dane’s claim can be understood as another example of interest in divorcing the authority of halakhic demands from claims for supernatural intervention in human affairs.