Sodom and Gomorrah Afire, Jacob de Wet II, c. 1680. Hessisches Landesmuseum Darmstadt, Germany
Sodom’s Collective Punishment—Shall the Judge of All the Earth Not Do Justice?
Abraham challenges God’s plan to destroy Sodom with two distinct arguments: the innocent must not suffer alongside the guilty, and a righteous minority should suffice to spare an entire city. Why does Abraham stop at ten innocents? Can collective punishment ever be just? The Rabbis sharpen Abraham’s critique of divine justice. Yet the story’s implications extend beyond whether perfect justice is attainable: God chose Abraham to teach his descendants righteousness and justice, even when it means challenging God.
Published: October 27, 2026
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Last Updated: October 28, 2026
H. D. Lewis, “Collective Responsibility,” Philosophy 23.84 (1948): 3–18 [p. 3]. For an overview of the debate see Marion Smiley, “Collective Responsibility,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (Winter 2022 edition). A recent handbook devotes nearly six hundred pages to its ramifications: Saba Bazargan-Forward and Deborah Tollefsen, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility (Routledge, 2020).
Irwin Lipnowski, “A Partial Rehabilitation of the Principle of Collective Punishment,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 8.1 (1993): 121–125.
Jean-Paul Brodeur, “Collective Punishment: Criminological Assessment: A Reply to Lipnowski’s ‘A Partial Rehabilitation of the Principle of Collective Punishment,’” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 8.1 (1993): 127–130; see also Lipnowski’s rejoinder, “A Reply to Professor Brodeur,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 8.1 (1993): 131–134.
Unless otherwise noted, biblical translations follow The JPS Tanakh (Jewish Publication Society, 2023), with adjustments.
Under divine command morality, God’s will creates moral right and wrong, and nothing God decrees can be unjust, since justice has no content apart from the decree. On the second position, righteousness and justice possess independent validity; a morally perfect God commands them but does not constitute them, and his own conduct can therefore be measured against them.
Plato, Euthyphro 7a, 9–10. For the modern formulation and its application to Jewish sources, see Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, “Divine Command Morality and Jewish Tradition,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 23.1 (1995): 39–67 [pp. 39–40].
If tzedakah u-mishpat meant whatever God wills, Abraham’s question הֲשֹׁפֵט כָּל הָאָרֶץ לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט, “Shall the Judge of all the earth not do justice?” (18:25) could not arise: whatever the Judge did would be justice by definition.
Sagi and Statman, “Divine Command Morality,” 45–55. For a fuller treatment, see Avi Sagi, Morality and Religion: The Jewish Story, Jewish Thought and Philosophy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 1–126.
Genesis 18:21 is itself difficult. The word כָּלָה can be read as a noun, “annihilation” (hence “if so, destruction!”), or adverbially as “altogether,” yielding the familiar NJPS rendering, “whether they have acted altogether according to the outcry that has reached Me; if not, I will take note.” On the first reading God is confirming a verdict; on the second he genuinely suspends judgment. My understanding is influenced by Robert Alter’s reading in The Hebrew Bible: A Translation with Commentary, 3 vols. (W. W. Norton, 2019), 1.59.
The traditions about Sodom in the prophets help explain the rabbinic interpretations: Jeremiah charges Sodom with adultery, habitual deceit, and the normalization of wrongdoing (Jer 23:14); Ezekiel with arrogance and the refusal to sustain the poor, never mentioning sexual transgression (Ezek 16:49–50). Almost no classical Jewish source locates Sodom’s sin in same-sex relations as such; the sexual connotation of “sodomy” derives from the ecclesiastical Latin peccatum Sodomiticum. See J. A. Loader, A Tale of Two Cities: Sodom and Gomorrah in the Old Testament, Early Jewish and Early Christian Traditions, Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology 1 (Kok, 1990).
The idiom is stronger than its conventional rendering suggests. It derives from the root ח.ל.ל, “to profane”: Abraham declares that such an act would be a profanation for God. Everett Fox (The Five Books of Moses [Schocken Books, 1995], 79n25) translates the phrase as “Heaven forbid!” and notes that the expression literally means “‘may you have a curse,’ an ironic turn of phrase in this situation.” On this reading Abraham’s words do more than pose a question: they warn God against committing an injustice.
The wordplay is noted by Alter, The Hebrew Bible, 1.62–64.
The negotiation runs through Genesis 18:28–31 in identical form; only the opening exchange, Abraham’s first apology, and the final exchange are quoted here.
Nahum M. Sarna, Genesis, JPS Torah Commentary (Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 134, comparing the ten elders of Ruth 4:2.
The dictum concerning mercy toward the cruel appears in several versions. See also Midrash Zuta to Qohelet 7:16. Genesis Rabbah asserts the need to balance the two attributes of mercy and justice:
בראשית רבה יב:טו ה' אֱלֹהִים, לְמֶלֶךְ שֶׁהָיוּ לוֹ כּוֹסוֹת רֵיקִים, אָמַר הַמֶּלֶךְ אִם אֲנִי נוֹתֵן לְתוֹכָן חַמִּין, הֵם מִתְבַּקְּעִין. צוֹנֵן, הֵם מַקְרִיסִין, וּמֶה עָשָׂה הַמֶּלֶךְ עֵרַב חֲמִין בְּצוֹנֵן וְנָתַן בָּהֶם וְעָמָדוּ.
Gen. Rab. 12:15 “The Lord God” – this is analogous to a king who had empty cups [of very thin glass]. The king said: If I pour hot water into them, they will shatter; [if I pour very] cold water, they will crack. What did the king do? He mixed hot and cold water and placed it in them, and they endured.
כָּךְ אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אִם בּוֹרֵא אֲנִי אֶת הָעוֹלָם בְּמִדַּת הָרַחֲמִים, הֲוֵי חֶטְיָיה סַגִּיאִין. בְּמִדַּת הַדִּין, הָאֵיךְ הָעוֹלָם יָכוֹל לַעֲמֹד. אֶלָּא הֲרֵי אֲנִי בּוֹרֵא אוֹתוֹ בְּמִדַּת הַדִּין וּבְמִדַּת הָרַחֲמִים, וְהַלְּוַאי יַעֲמֹד.
So, the Holy One blessed be He said: If I create the world with [just] the attribute of mercy, there will be many sinners; if [just] with the attribute of strict justice, how will the world endure? Rather, I will create it with [both] the attribute of justice and the attribute of mercy, would that it will endure.
Translation adapted from The Sefaria Midrash Rabbah (Sefaria, 2022). Editor’s note: See also Herbert Basser, “YHWH and Elohim: One God, Different Attributes,” TheTorah (2026).
Translations of Genesis Rabbah are adapted from The Sefaria Midrash Rabbah (Sefaria, 2022).
Midrash Tannaim is a 20th century scholarly reconstruction, drawn from medieval midrashic material, of a lost 2nd century C.E. midrash on Deuteronomy.
The verse is text-critically contested. The Masoretic text reads:
דברים לב:ח בְּהַנְחֵל עֶלְיוֹן גּוֹיִם בְּהַפְרִידוֹ בְּנֵי אָדָם יַצֵּב גְּבֻלֹת עַמִּים לְמִסְפַּר בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל.
Deut 32:8 When the Most High gave the nations their inheritance, when He divided humankind, He fixed the boundaries of peoples according to the number of the children of Israel.
A Qumran fragment and the Septuagint, however, read בני אלהים / “sons of God” rather than the Masoretic בני ישראל, so that the nations are apportioned according to the number of the lesser divinities. See Jeffrey H. Tigay, Deuteronomy, JPS Torah Commentary (Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 302–303, 513–515. Editor’s note: See also Emanuel Tov, “The Sons of Israel or God? – Deuteronomy 32:8,” TheTorah (2023). The midrash presupposes the Masoretic text.
Midrash Tannaim to Deuteronomy 32:8, in David Zvi Hoffmann, ed., Midrasch Tannaïm zum Deuteronomium (M. Poppelauer, 1908–1909). No published English translation was available to me; the rendering was prepared for this essay with the assistance of the AI model Claude Fable 5 (Anthropic).
See the extended discussion at b. Berakhot 5a–b. The biblical footing for this principle is slim: essentially limited to the educative view of divine discipline in Deuteronomy 8:5, Proverbs 3:11–12, Psalm 94:12, and Job 5:17, the very verses the rabbinic discussions adduce. For additional discussion, see David Kraemer, Responses to Suffering in Classical Rabbinic Literature (Oxford University Press, 1995), 188–199.
[21] Holly Joan Toensing, “Women of Sodom and Gomorrah: Collateral Damage in the War against Homosexuality?,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 21.2 (2005): 61–74.
Many scholars regard the Elihu speeches (Job 32–37) as a later insertion into an already complete book; see Edward L. Greenstein, Job: A New Translation (Yale University Press, 2019). The passage is read here in its received form.
Of course, this does not solve the moral problem discussed earlier of the destruction of women and children in Sodom. According to most contemporary Western cultural approaches, this seems to remain an unsolvable problem in the narrative.
In medieval Jewish philosophy such a posture became nearly unthinkable, and the tradition largely reinterpreted or passed over the sources expressing it. Yet even then the gap was not filled by divine command morality: Saadia Gaon dismissed that position as unworthy of discussion, and Maimonides grounded the moral commandments in reason. The sources of protest remain part of the canonical corpus, and contemporary Jewish thought has begun to reclaim them. For this reclamation see Menachem Fisch, Berit Imut: Kavim le-Fulmus ha-Meḥuyavut ha-Datit be-Sifrut Ḥazal [Covenant of Confrontation: Outlines of the Debate over Religious Commitment in Rabbinic Literature] (Bar-Ilan University Press, 2019), 68–76; Avi Sagi and Nir Sagi, “Religious Protest and Religious Loyalty,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12.2 (2020): 7–36; Dov Weiss, Pious Irreverence: Confronting God in Rabbinic Judaism, Divinations: Rereading Late Ancient Religion (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). My reading of the rabbinic material is indebted to all three.