Job on the Dunghill (detail), Gonzalo Carrasco 1881. Wikimedia
Speaking Truth to Power, Job Accuses God of Being Unjust
Job’s friends piously justify God’s actions and challenge Job to accept that he has done wrong. Yet God sides with Job and rebukes the friends for not “speaking about me in honesty as did my servant Job.”
Published: May 19, 2020
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Last Updated: September 7, 2026
This essay is based in large part on Edward L. Greenstein, “Truth or Theodicy? Speaking Truth to Power in the Book of Job,” Princeton Seminary Bulletin 27 (2006), pp. 238–258; and on a presentation made at the Herzl Institute, Jerusalem, 25 February 2014.
For the translation and interpretation of passages from Job, see my Job: A New Translation (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2019).
The poet emphasizes the physicality of speech. In the opening of one of Zophar the Na’amatite’s speeches, for example, he says:
איוב יא:ב הֲרֹב דְּבָרִים לֹא יֵעָנֶה וְאִם אִישׁ שְׂפָתַיִם יִצְדָּק...
Job 11:2 Should one long of speech be unanswered? Should a man keen of lips be found in the right?...
יא:ה וְאוּלָם מִי יִתֵּן אֱלוֹהַּ דַּבֵּר וְיִפְתַּח שְׂפָתָיו עִמָּךְ.
11:5 If only Eloah (the deity) would speak, and open his lips with you.
Cf. Victor E. Reichert, Job: Hebrew Text and English Translation with an Introduction and Commentary (London: Soncino, 1946), p. xviii. For the argument between Job and his companions as one between adherence to dogma and an insistence on what appears to be true, see already Immanuel Kant, “On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy” [1791], trans. George di Giovanni, in Religion and Rational Theology, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 19-37.
This distinction in itself complicates matters. In brief, objective truth posits a correlation between a proposition and reality (correspondence), between a proposition and other propositions (coherence), or between a proposition and a successful result (pragmatic). Subjective truth—which we will be discussing further below—identifies truth with truthfulness, with a correspondence between a proposition and one’s belief. See, e.g., E. Jonathan Lowe, “Truth,” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxoford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 881–882 (and follow the cross-references). For a more sophisticated discussion of truth from various perspectives and in different disciplines, see Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
See, e.g., Yoram Hazony, “Truth and Being in the Hebrew Bible,” The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 193-218.
In Post-biblical, Hebrew ken begins to function as a term for “yes”. In Biblical Hebrew there is no word for “yes.” In Biblical Hebrew, to express affirmation—the idea of “yes”—one repeats the language of a question or statement with the option of deleting any and all words following the first word. For example, in Exod. 2:7 Moses’s sister asks Pharaoh’s daughter, הַאֵלֵךְ וְקָרָאתִי לָךְ אִשָּׁה מֵינֶקֶת מִן הָעִבְרִיֹּת וְתֵינִק לָךְ אֶת הַיָּלֶד “Should I go and summon for you a nursing woman from the Hebrews?” The answer, a yes, is: לֵכִי “Go!” (verse 8), which is short for “Go and summon for me a nursing woman from the Hebrews!” See Edward L. Greenstein, “The Syntax of Saying ‘Yes’ in Biblical Hebrew,” Journal of the Ancient Near Eastern Society 19 (1989; Moshe Held Memorial Volume): 51–59.
In Deuteronomy, the same law is phrased with a synonym:
דברים ה:טז וְלֹא תַעֲנֶה בְרֵעֲךָ עֵד שָׁוְא.
Deut 5:17 And you shall not testify spurious testimony against your neighbor.
A variation on this law appears in the Covenant Collection:
שמות כג:א לֹא תִשָּׂא שֵׁמַע שָׁוְא אַל תָּשֶׁת יָדְךָ עִם רָשָׁע לִהְיֹת עֵד חָמָס.
Exod 23:1 Do not spread false rumors; you shall not join hands with the guilty to act as a malicious witness.
The version in Deuteronomy 5:10 is identical.
Rashi connects the third clause of the verse to the first—lying concerning a theft. The thief will lie to cover up his crime. Rashbam interprets it in the context of a loan—a borrower may deny that he was loaned something. Ibn Ezra imagines the reverse scenario: שיבקש ממון מי שאין לו אצלו כלום, a person will demand his money back from someone who never had it.
Bekhor Shor proposes yet another scenario for the cheating described in this verse:
שתַתְנֶה לחבירך: אם תתן לי כך וכך , אעשה לך מלאכתך; ותקח את שלו ולא תקיים תנאו.
You make a deal with your friend that, if you do such and such, I will do your work for you; you will take the payment, but not fulfill the deal.
In any or all of these scenarios, the liar is condemned.
Rashi and many other commentators connect this injunction to the Decalogue; and see my Torah.com essay “An Inner-Biblical Elaboration of the Decalogue” (March 2016).
See the dissertation of my former student, Yoshi Fargeon, "למה תתענו ה'?": מעורבותו של אלוהים בשקרים ובהטעיות בסיפור המקראי [“’Why, O Lord, Do You Lead Us Astray?” God’s Involvement in Lying and Deception in the Bible”] (Ph.D. Dissertation, Bar-Ilan University, 2014).
Cf. Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 10-31(Anchor Bible; New York: Doubleday, 2009), p. 737.
These two words are a scribe’s mistake in recopying the preceding two words (dittography).
I read according to the Ketiv (received spelling): לא. The sages (Mishnah Sotah 5:5) and the Masoretic scribes want to read לו: “I will wait for Him.” However, the point of this passage is that Job is pressing his case; and the reading of the Ketiv find support in Elihu’s rebuttal in 35:14: “The matter’s before Him, / And you must wait.”
Reading דרכיו, “his ways.” It makes no sense for Job to accuse God of his own ways (דרכי—so the Masoretic Text). Accordingly, we should understand that this is one of several ancient scribal “corrections” (tiqqunei soferim) made to the text of Job, in order to preserve the honor of the Deity. Some of these corrections are acknowledged in rabbinic literature.
Truth and truthfulness can sometimes be in tension. For example, the impulse to be honest may conflict with one’s feeling that telling a particular truth might cause an undesirable consequence. See Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
For a fine survey of the most pertinent material from the Tanakh up through the work of Elie Wiesel, see Anson Laytner, Arguing with God: A Jewish Tradition (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1990).
Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael D. Rich, Truth Decay: An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in American Public Life (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018).
See Ephraim E. Urbach, “בקשת האמת כחובה דתית” [Seeking Truth as a Religious Obligation], in המקרא ואנחנו [The Bible and Us], ed. Uriel Simon, פרסומי המכון ליהדות ולמחשבה בת זמננו [Publications of the Institute for Judaism and Contemporary Thought] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1979), 13–27.
See also, j. Sanhedrin 1:5.
See, e.g., Gershom Scholem, “Golem,” Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971), vol. 7, cols. 753-55. See further Moshe Idel, Golem: Jewish Magical and Mystical Traditions on the Artificial Anthropoid (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).