The Origins of Constitutional Thought—Found in Deuteronomy

In a striking departure from prevailing notions of kingship in both the ancient Near East and early Israel, Deuteronomy introduces the separation of powers among distinct branches of government and subjects all political actors—including the monarch—to the rule of Torah. In effect, Deuteronomy provides a blueprint for the modern concept of the rule of law. These principles rest on an even more revolutionary idea: the establishment of an independent judiciary.

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Published: August 27, 2025

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Last Updated: September 7, 2026

  1. bnm . il. / špḥ / lṭpn . wqdš. M. Dietrich, O. Loretz, and J. Sanmartín, eds., The Cuneiform Alphabetic Texts from Ugarit, Ras Ibn Hani and Other Places (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 1995), text 1.16.I.9–11 and 20–22. Subsequent references to this edition are abbreviated CAT. For Ugaritic texts and translations, see Simon B. Parker, ed., Ugaritic Narrative Poetry, SBLWAW 9 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997).

  2. The formula corresponds to one that is common in Akkadian in the secular context of family law: ana mārūti (aplūti) nadānu, “to appoint/designate for sonship.” The formula is attested in second millennium texts from Mari and in first millennium Assyrian and neo-Babylonian contracts. Such speech acts constitute legally binding declarations. See Jeffrey H. Tigay, Enc Jud (1971): 2.300–301, s.v. “Adoption”; and Shalom M. Paul, “Adoption Formulae: A Study of Cuneiform and Biblical Legal Clauses,” Maarav 2 (1979–80): 176–185 (at pp. 178, 182–183). See also the discussion of the king as YHWH’s son in Marc Zvi Brettler and Amy-Jill Levine, “Psalm 2: Is the Messiah the Son of God? TheTorah (2020).

  3. Biblical translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

  4. The notion of divine kingship was rejected by the Semitic rulers of Babylon and effectively disappeared after the Ur III period (2112–2004 B.C.E.). For a valuable overview, see Wilfred G. Lambert, “Kingship in Ancient Mesopotamia,” in King and Messiah in Israel and the Ancient Near East: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar, ed. John Day, JSOTSup 270 (London: Bloomsbury, 1998), 55–70.

  5. Ḫammurabi rēʾûm nibīt Enlil anāku. Unless otherwise indicated, texts and translations of the Laws of Hammurabi (LH) follow Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 2nd ed., SBLWAW 6 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997).

  6. See Moshe Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume, ed. M. Haran (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1960), 5–28; reprinted, idem, Studies in the Bible and Jewish Thought (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1995), 25–50.

  7. Ḫammurabi šar mīšarim ša Šamaš kīnātim išrukušum anāku.

  8. The king indirectly stands in for the adult male missing from the family units of widows and orphans. This commitment of the king to protect the widow and the orphan by hearing their cases was a widely distributed Near Eastern topos found in diverse literary genres. Samuel E. Loewenstamm, “Law,” in The World History of the Jewish People: Ancient Times, vol. 3, Judges, ed. Benjamin Mazar (New Brunswick: Jewish History Publications Ltd. and Rutgers University Press, 1971), 232.

  9. šqlt / bǵlt . ydk . ltdn / dn . almnt . ltṯpṭ / ṯpṭ qṣr . npš . ltdy / tšm ʿ1 . dl . See also Dan El in the Aqhat epic (CAT 1.17.V.4–8 and 1.19.I.19–25). For a discussion of the topos, see John Day, “The Canaanite Inheritance of the Israelite Monarchy,” in Day, King and Messiah in Israel and the Ancient Near East, 75–90, esp. 86–87.

  10. raggam u ṣēnam ana ḫulluqim dannum enšam ana la ḫabālim, kīma Šamaš ana ṣalmāt qaqqadim waṣêmma mātim nuwwurim (my translation). The “black-haired ones” here is simply a conventional reference to humanity, as distinct from the gods.

  11. Similarities also exist between Israelite and ancient Near Eastern royal ideology with respect to the king’s role in maintaining the cult and commanding the military. The Greek conception of Bronze Age kingship also contained comparable themes. See Martin L. West, The East Face of Helicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 14–19, 132–137.

  12. See Baruch Halpern, “Jerusalem and the Lineages in the Seventh Century BCE: Kinship and the Rise of Individual Moral Liability,” in Law and Ideology in Monarchic Israel, ed. Baruch Halpern and Deborah W. Hobson (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 11, 27, 74–75 (a stimulating analysis of the archaeological and literary evidence and of Deuteronomy’s connection to the immense social change wrought by Hezekiah and Josiah). Cult sites other than those in Jerusalem were demolished, while the Jerusalem Temple itself was purged of any elements not viewed as Yahwistic. Even previously legitimate Yahwistic shrines in the countryside were declared illegitimate, despite their legacy of having legendary patriarchal and prophetic figures associated with them.

  13. Bernard M. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 23–52.

  14. Deuteronomy lays out a plan for the complete restructuring of the major public institutions of ancient Judah, including the judiciary (16:18–20, 17:2–13), monarchy (17:14–20), priesthood (18:1–8), and office of the prophet (18:9–22). For a reconstruction of the historical background of the professional appointees, see Moshe Weinfeld, “Judge and Officer in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East,” Israel Oriental Studies 7 (1977): 65.

  15. The elders were deeply rooted in the clan network of the Judean countryside and thus operated independently of any centralized state authority. On the elders, see Moshe Weinfeld, “Elder,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica (1972), 6:578–580; Leslie J. Hoppe, “The Origins of Deuteronomy” (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1978); Leslie J. Hoppe, “Elders and Deuteronomy,” Église et Théologie 14 (1983): 259; Joachim Buchholz, Die Ältesten Israels im Deuteronomium (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988); Jan Christian Gertz, Die Gerichtsorganisation Israels im Deuteronomischen Gesetz (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), 173–225.

  16. On the judicial role of the village gate, see Victor H. Matthews, “Entrance Ways and Threshing Floors: Legally Significant Sites in the Ancient Near East.” Fides et Historia 19 (1987): 25–40.

  17. Emphasis added. Textual silence as a form of rewriting legal history is also evident in rabbinic literature, where a competing power claim may in effect be “written out of the record” by way of polemical delegitimation. See Moshe David Herr, “The Continuity of the Chain of Tradition of the Torah,” Zion 44 (1979): 43, 46–47 (Hebrew).

  18. The elders are depicted as active in another section of the legal corpus, which primarily addresses sex and family law. Scholars have divided on how to understand the elders’ retention there: Either it amounts to the contraction of their area of responsibility to such cases alone, so that the new system exists alongside the old (see, e.g., Weinfeld, “Elders,” at 578–880), or, more likely, it reflects the compositional history of the legal corpus, with that section representing an older stratum of law that has not been brought into conformity with the core legislation that reflects centralization (see, e.g., Rofé, “Organization of the Judiciary,” at 200–201). For the challenge that this stratum is indeed Deuteronomic, see Otto, “Ša’ar,” 375–376.

  19. Moshe Weinfeld, “Ordeal of Jealousy,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica ( 1972), 12:1449–1450; Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “The Judicial Ordeal in the Ancient Near East” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1977), 474–480; Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “The Strange Case of the Suspected Sotah (Numbers v 11–31),” Vetus Testamentum 34 (1984): 11; Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “Suprarational Legal Procedures in Elam and Nuzi,” in Studies on the Civilization and Culture of Nuzi and the Hurrians in Honor of Ernest R. Lacheman, ed. M. A. Morrison & D. I. Owen (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1981), 115.

  20. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics, 127–133. See also Karel van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia: A Comparative Study (Aasen: Van Gorcum, 1985), 45–55 (on the forensic function of oaths). In such cases, the convention of the judicial oath is attested in both biblical and cuneiform law. The technical formula in biblical law is “an oath by YHWH” (Exod 22:10). That represents the exact interdialectical equivalent of the Akkadian nīš ilim, “[oath by] the life of the god.” Similarly, the biblical formula that stipulates the cultic location of the judicial oath is “before God” (Exod 21:6; 22:7). That formula corresponds precisely to the Akkadian: ina maḫar ilim. For examples of judicial oaths in the context of cuneiform law, see Laws of Eshnunna § 37; and Laws of Hammurabi §§ 9, 23, 107, 120, 126, 266, at 82–83, 85, 101, 104, 105, 130.

  21. Contrast with the NJPS translation, “If a case is too baffling for you to decide....” While that rendering is on the right track, my translation seeks to convey the specific legal situation here more precisely. The legal case refers to one in which human reason cannot operate because it lacks all the facts. The phrase employs the same grammatical formula—the niphal of פלא + prepositional מן bound to a divine or human reference—as when Job finally recants his legal case against God on account o fthe overwhelming disproportion between divine and human knowledge:

    איוב מב:ג מִי זֶה מַעְלִים עֵצָה בְּלִי דָעַת לָכֵן הִגַּדְתִּי וְלֹא אָבִין נִפְלָאוֹת מִמֶּנִּי וְלֹא אֵדָע.
    Job 42:3 Who is this who obscures counsel without knowledge? Thus I spoke without understanding—things too wondrous for me, which I did not know.

    As Job drops his legal case consequent upon a divine theophany, so conversely in the context of Deuteronomy 17:8–13, in the absence of the witnesses that would permit empirical adjudication, the legal case must be refer to the Temple for divine arbitration. Note further the antithesis of Deuteronomy 17:8’s protasis in Genesis: הֲיִפָּלֵא מֵיְהוָה דָּבָר, “Is anything too wondrous for YHWH?” (Gen 18:14).

  22. [22] As noted by Norbert Lohfink, “Distribution of the Functions of Power: The Laws Concerning Public Offices in Deuteronomy 16:18–18:22,” in A Song of Power and the Power of Song: Essays on the Book of Deuteronomy, ed. Duane L. Christensen (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1993), 336–352.

  23. For more on how the two legal paragraphs (Deut 17:2–7; 17:8–13) that introduce this double transformation of local justice interlock, see Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics, 127–133.

  24. For an analysis of how Solomon is redactionally aggrandized in conventional Near Eastern terms as possessing superior skills of royal administration as well as encyclopedic wisdom, see Gary N. Knoppers, Two Nations under God: The Deuteronomistic History of Solomon and the Dual Monarchies 1 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993–94), 83–87. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 254–257, carefully analyzes the transformation of the concept of wisdom within the passage, from pragmatic shrewdness to judicial insight. See also Hilary Lipka, “King Solomon Solves the Case of the Two Prostitutes,” TheTorah (2023).

  25. Critical components of royal prestige that are obscured or contracted in this law include the monarch’s playing a significant role in the state cultus, serving as defender of the Temple, initiating and conducting military campaigns, and the unrestricted right to a harem as a sign of both wealth and potency. See Gary N. Knoppers, Two Nations under God, 2:223–225; Knoppers, “The Deuteronomist and the Deuteronomic Law of the King: A Reexamination of a Relationship,” ZAW 108 (1996): 329; Knoppers, “Rethinking the Relationship between Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History,” CBQ 63 (2001): 393. On the eclipse of royal judicial authority, see further Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics, 138–143.

  26. Norbert Lohfink, “Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 336, argues that “Torah” refers to Deuteronomy 12–28 for the Deuteronomistic author of this passage. See also Georg Braulik, “Die Ausdrücke für ‘Gesetz’ im Buch Deuteronomium,” Biblica 51 (1970): 39; reprinted in Studien zur Theologie des Deuteronomiums (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1988), 11, 36–38.

  27. Post-biblical Jewish tradition does not maintain this utopian constitutional vision. Rabbinic authors were confronted by biblical sources that were inconsistent about the status of the monarch. More important, they also had to deal with the gap between utopian vision and pragmatic political reality. On that basis, Jewish law in the Mishnah (ca. 200 C.E.) abandons the constraints imposed by Deuteronomy and no longer subordinates the monarch to law:

    משנה סנהדרין ב:ב הַמֶּלֶךְ לֹא דָן וְלֹא דָנִין אוֹתוֹ, לֹא מֵעִיד וְלֹא מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ
    m. Sanh. 2:2 The king does not judge nor does one judge him. He does not testify nor does one testify regarding him.

    See further Michael Walzer, “The Constitution of Monarchy,” in The Jewish Political Tradition, vol. 1, Authority, ed. Michael Walzer, Menachem Lorberbaum, Noam J. Zohar (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 139 (noting the “failure to incorporate kingship within a constitutional structure” and suggesting reasons for it). The translation of the Mishnah follows The Oxford Annotated Mishnah, ed. Shaye J. D. Cohen, Robert Goldenberg, and Hayim Lapin, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 2:501.

  28. šumma dajānum dīnam idīn purussâm iprus kunukkam ušēzib  warkānumma dīnšu īteni dajānam šuāti ina dīn idīnu enêm ukannušuma rugummâm ša ina dīnim šuāti ibbaššu adi 12-šu inaddin u ina puḫrim ina kussī dajānūtišu ušetbûšuma ul itârma itti dajānī ina dīnim ul uššab.

  29. See, e.g., Greenberg, Some Postulates, 27–28; and Lohfink, “Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 308.

  30. awâtīya ša ina narîya ašṭuru and awâtīya šūqurātim (LH xlix 19–21, xlviii 12–13).

  31. It is precisely this practice, however, that undercut the affective rhetoric in royal ideology that asserted the king’s solicitude for the socially marginalized. The content of the legal corpora tended to entrench class privilege and rigid social stratification, and thereby was no true guard against autocratic abuses of power. Eckart Otto, “Soziale Restitution und Vertragsrecht: Mīšaru(m), (an)durāru(m), kirenzi, parā tarnumar, šemiṭṭa und derôr in Mesopotamien, Syrien, in der Hebräischen Bibel und die Frage des Rechtstransfers im Alten Orient,” Revue D’Assyriologie 92 (1998): 125, 140n64.

  32. Lohfink, “Distribution of the Functions of Power,” 305–323.

  33. The laws regarding the priesthood and the office of the prophet are similarly modified by Deuteronomy. See the more comprehensive presentation of the ideas here in Bernard M. Levinson, “The First Constitution: Rethinking the Origins of Rule of Law and Separation of Powers in Light of Deuteronomy,” Cardozo Law Review 27, no. 4 (2006): 1853–1888.

  34. The text’s speaker, the “Moses” of Deuteronomy, is represented as creating the entire public administration of the state: outlining terms, conditions, and areas of responsibility; providing operational guidelines (including conditions of appointment, such as professional training, probity, citizenship, or lineage); defining areas of restricted or prohibited activity; and selectively including sanctions for abuse of office.

  35. Julius Wellhausen recognized this issue long ago, although in reference to specific material that he regarded as later insertions into the legal corpus. See Julius Wellhausen, Die Composition des Hexateuchs und der Historischen Bücher des Alten Testaments, 4th ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1963), 192; see also Lothar Perlitt, “Der Staatsgedanke im Deuteronomium,” in Language, Theology, and the Bible: Essays in Honour of James Barr, ed. Samuel E. Balentine and John Barton (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 182, 190.

  36. Donald S. Lutz, A Preface to American Political Theory, American Political Thought (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 136.