The Purification of a Niddah: The Legal Responsibility of the Reader

A rejoinder to Rabbi Dr. Zev Farber’s “The Purification of a Niddah: The Torah Requirement.”

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The Purification of a Niddah: The Legal Responsibility of the Reader

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In his insightful analysis “The Purification of a Niddah: The Torah Requirement,” Rabbi Dr. Zev Farber points out that the requirement for a niddah to wash is not mentioned where we would expect it in Leviticus 15, nor in any other place in the Torah. From here, he draws the conclusion that the priestly laws did not require any kind of washing, such that the woman was rendered pure automatically by waiting seven days. Since this conclusion is not only at odds with traditional Jewish practice but also with the views of several academic biblical scholars, it offers a fascinating test-case for examining the role of the reader in interpreting biblical law.

I will not argue with Farber regarding the textual details of Lev 15 and claim that the washing of the niddah is implied from other laws in the chapter. This latter approach is the more usually taken one (as the citations in the essay indicate), but I believe that it misses the main issue.

My basic claim is different and builds on the recognition – emphasized by literary critics of the school of reader-response criticism – that the meaning of a text is dependent on the participation of an informed reader.[1] That is to say, the reader is not a blank slate onto which the text inscribes its meanings, but rather, the reader is an active participant who is expected to fill in gaps in the text. With this general orientation in mind, my goal here is to substantiate the premise that the text takes for granted that its readers assume that a niddah requires washing.[2]

The Savage Jew

As a point of departure, it is useful to place the biblical requirements in a wider cross-cultural context, since menstrual impurity is an extremely wide-spread phenomenon in traditional cultures. As is well known, a large commonality can be found between these practices, characterized by avoidance of contact with menstruants, their seclusion and especially by a prohibition of sexual relations which was considered dangerous.[3] Regarding the dangers of sexual relations, there is no reason to think that the ancient Israelites were an exception, when one considers the threat of “being cut off” (karet) in Lev 20:18.[4]

Indeed, the etymology of niddah points in the same direction. Deriving the term from the root נד”ד, Moshe Greenberg observed that the semantic fields of this root in Hebrew and Aramaic “indicate a basic meaning of ‘distance oneself’ with negative connotation, as in flight from disgust or abhorrence,[5] such that niddah could be rendered “rejected one” (see e.g. Lam 1:8, 17). Hence, Farber’s emphasis on the temple as the primary locus of purity misses the point. Once it is acknowledged that menstrual impurity was a serious concern even in daily life, it becomes less likely that it would be treated less stringently than the other forms of impurity.

Furthermore, as a scholar who specializes in cross-cultural purity practices, I would add that impurities generally require some kind of ritual act to remove them, with washing constituting a minimal requirement.[6]

In fact, it is noteworthy that even the Karaites, known for their rejection of the rabbinic tradition, require the niddah to wash.[7] I do not cite the Karaite practice because I think it necessarily reflects a continuous tradition extending back to biblical times, but rather because it exemplifies an assumption which is self-evident to any culture that observes purity practices, that impurity – especially a severe form – does not just go away.

Fill in the Blanks

Turning back to the biblical requirements, Farber provides an interesting survey of the rabbinic attempts to address the absence of an explicit requirement to wash. However, it must be remembered that it is of little significance whether or not rabbis at a later period felt uncomfortable with this omission.[8] The real question pertains to the audience assumed by the text, which I will argue did not share the scholastic perspective of these medieval rabbis. Note again that even the Karaites understood the washing to be implied by the text and not based on rabbinic midrash.

Clearly, the priestly laws aim to be as systematic as possible, but this goal is achieved by means of short-hand formulations and self-referential notes which assume a competent reader to understand and fill in the blanks. For example, note the one word short-hand references in Lev 12:2, 5 comparing the new mother to a niddah (כנדתה), requiring the reader to fill in the missing information – in this case from Lev 15 (or from previous knowledge). In this regard, formulas such as “he will be impure until the evening” or “she will be impure for seven days” take for granted that these periods of impurity end with purification by washing.

At first glance, such inferences may seem forced. Since so many laws are spelled out in detail, should we not avoid reading anything further into the text? Though such an approach appears reasonable, it overlooks the possibility that certain requirements were so obvious that there was no need for pedantically exhaustive presentation.

I would contend that washing was required for all of the types of impurity. As such, the text is careful to state the duration of each type of pollution, since this was the variable element, whereas the requirement to wash was fixed, so that it could be omitted. Indeed, additional examples where we find the omission of the washing requirement include: Lev 11:40 versus 17:15 regarding the consumption of an improperly killed clean animal; Lev 11:31 for touching a creeping creature (שרץ) compared with a vessel which must be washed (32); the person who gathers the ashes of the red cow whom the text only requires to launder (Num 19:10) versus the others involved in preparing the ashes (7–8);[9] and Num 31:24 versus 19:19 regarding corpse impurity. To this list, one should also add (against Farber) the zavah (Lev 15:28–30), whose purification can be clearly inferred from the zav (13).[10]

A Return to Common (Ritual) Sense

With this alternative mode of reading in mind, let us return to Farber’s conclusion, that the menstruant was not required to wash, and see if it can stand up to counter-evidence. Here are some brief points to consider:

  1. If the minor impurity caused by sexual relations required washing (Lev 15:16–18), is it plausible that a prohibition of the magnitude of menstrual impurity, involving the possibility of the karet punishment, would just go away automatically?
  2. Both the zavah (15:29) and the parturient (12:6–8) are commanded to bring offerings to the sanctuary as part of their purification, but in neither case is washing mentioned! Are we to assume that these impurity bearers were exempted (because they are women?) from the general requirement enforced by capital punishment to undergo washing before any contact with the sacred realm? Note, for example, the strictures incumbent on the priesthood to wash upon entering the sanctuary (Ex 30:20–21) or before partaking in the sacrificial offerings (Lev 22:1–8) on the penalty of death.
  3. Farber’s case would be much stronger if he had an example of a narrative which would seem to imply that no washing was necessary, but none exists. As it turns out, we have a narrative which indicates the very opposite. Indeed, the story of David and Bathsheba divulges (only because it is central to the plot) that Bathsheba washed after her menstrual impurity, indicating not only the existence of the practice but also the audience’s familiarity with it (with no further explanation needed). Are we to assume that Leviticus is seeking to undermine a more stringent popular practice by omitting the requirement to wash?

In my mind, the answer to all of these questions should be negative, indicating that Farber’s conclusion is highly unlikely.

In conclusion, the foregoing considerations call our attention to the fact that our conventions of reading (as academics, rabbis or whatever) may not be those presupposed by the text. Moreover, I have attempted to demonstrate that an argument which appears forced or apologetic within a narrowly defined context may turn out to be the most sensible interpretation when viewed within a more expansive context.[11] To conclude our particular inquiry, my impression is that the priestly instructions were more interested in sparing words than sparing water.


The Purification of a Niddah

Next: “When Silence Matters” by Dr. Hacham Isaac S. D. Sassoon

Previous: “The Torah Requirement” by Dr. Rabbi Zev Farber


View Footnotes

Published 2014-04-24

  1. [1] For the application of reader-response criticism to priestly rules, see W.K. Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible. Meaning and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2004), 6 – 12.

  2. Regarding the nature of this washing in the First Temple Period, see the TABS devar Torah on Parashat Metzora by Hayah Katz: “Biblical Purification: Was it Immersion?”

  3. [3] See Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16 (AB; New York: Doubleday, 1991), 948–53, for a partial but convenient discussion of cross-cultural evidence, as well as Jewish evidence for the fear of menstrual pollution from Second Temple and medieval times. For easily accessible statements, see also m. Shabbat 2:6 and Ramban on Gen 31:35.

  4. Admittedly, since most scholars distinguish between the Priestly Source (P), responsible for most of Lev 1–16 and the Holiness Source (H), responsible for Lev 17–26, it is possible to argue that P did not recognize the punishment of karet for sexual relations with the menstruant. However, Baruch Schwartz has pointed out that the only ostensible halakhic contradiction between P and H pertains to the law of the niddah (The Holiness Legislation: Studies in the Priestly Code [Jerusalem: Magnes, 1999], 26 – 27 [Hebrew]). Namely, Lev 20:18 depicts sexual relations with a niddah as a severe transgression (cf. also 18:19), but in Lev 15 this prohibition is not mentioned at all! From here, many scholars conclude that P permitted these relations. However, if this is the only known contradiction between H and P, we should be cautious before positing such a wide discrepancy between blanket permission (P) and severe punishment (H). It may be more plausible to entertain a harmonistic solution, such as that offered by Ibn Ezra on Lev 15:24 which he understands as referring to accidental relations. A similar solution is expressed in Samaritan halakha. See See I. R. Bóid, Principles of Samaritan Halachah (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 149, 174.

  5. “The Etymology of נדה ‘Menstrual Impurity,’’ in Solving Riddles and Untying Knots: Biblical, Epigraphic, and Semitic studies in Honor of Jonas C. Greenfield (eds. Z. Zevit et al.; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 76.

  6. From a cursory inspection of cross-cultural evidence pertaining to menstrual impurity, I can affirm that menstrual pollution was/ is removed by washing in Hindu, Zoroastrian, Muslim and apparently ancient Egyptian religions. Regarding Mesopotamia, a check in the Chicago Assyrian Dictionary (M/2 239 – 40) for musukkatu (= “menstruant”) brings references to the impurity of water that a menstruant touches or bathes in (admittedly the context isn’t entirely clear). The alternative term urruštu (CAD U/W 248) yields similar references. I am not aware of any counter-example in which menstrual pollution goes away automatically.

  7. See Shaye J.D. Cohen, “Purity, Piety and Polemic: Medieval Rabbinic Denunciations of ‘Incorrect’ Purification Practices,” in Women and Water: Menstruation in Jewish Life and Law (ed. R.R. Wasserfall; Hanover: Brandeis University, 1999), 91–96.

  8. It seems doubtful, in fact, that R. Akiva was troubled by the problem discussed by Farber (see the reading of the Sifra cited in n. 11 of Farber’s article). Rather, his intention was take away the textual basis from his peers who were imposing extreme stringencies on niddot. As such, it is not surprising that R’ Yehudai’s solution is more convincing than the Rabbis. He may have been the first to deal seriously with the ‘problem.’

  9. Note that the requirement to launder implies a more stringent degree of impurity, applied on top of the washing requirement (see Lev 15 throughout).

  10. David P. Wright, The Disposal of Impurity: Elimination Rites in the Bible and in Hittite and Mesopotamian Literature (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 185, n. 38, 191, n. 44; Milgrom, ibid, 672

  11. For another illustration of this point focusing on the formula “eye for an eye,” see Edward Greenstein,”‘An Eye for an Eye, A Tooth for a Tooth’: Peshat, Derash, and the Question of Context” [in Hebrew] Resling: A Multi-Disciplinary Stage for Culture, vol. 5, 1998, 31-34, available here: www.resling.co.il/pdfs/issue_article_53.doc