Alexandre-Gabriel Decamps France, 1803-1860 (colorized). National Gallery of Art, Washington D.C.
Who Is the Eved Ivri?
The designation ivri in the legal corpora of the Pentateuch is found only in the laws of slavery. So who is this ivri slave and why was he sold?
Published: February 22, 2017
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Last Updated: September 7, 2026
The law continues by discussing what should be done with the slave’s wife and children, if he has them, and what to do if the slave wishes to remain a slave:
כא:ג אִם־בְּגַפּוֹ יָבֹא בְּגַפּוֹ יֵצֵא
20:3 If he came single, he shall leave single.
אִם־בַּעַל אִשָּׁה הוּא וְיָצְאָה אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ:
If he had a wife, his wife shall leave with him.
כא:ד אִם־אֲדֹנָיו יִתֶּן־לוֹ אִשָּׁה וְיָלְדָה־לוֹ בָנִים אוֹ בָנוֹת הָאִשָּׁה וִילָדֶיהָ תִּהְיֶה לַֽאדֹנֶיהָ וְהוּא יֵצֵא בְגַפּוֹ:
20:4 If his master gave him a wife, and she has borne him children, the wife and her children shall belong to the master, and he shall leave alone.
כא:ה וְאִם־אָמֹר יֹאמַר הָעֶבֶד אָהַבְתִּי אֶת־אֲדֹנִי אֶת־אִשְׁתִּי וְאֶת־בָּנָי לֹא אֵצֵא חָפְשִׁי: כא:ו וְהִגִּישׁוֹ אֲדֹנָיו אֶל־הָאֱלֹהִים וְהִגִּישׁוֹ אֶל־הַדֶּלֶת אוֹ אֶל־הַמְּזוּזָה וְרָצַע אֲדֹנָיו אֶת־אָזְנוֹ בַּמַּרְצֵעַ וַעֲבָדוֹ לְעֹלָם:
20:5 But if the slave declares, “I love my master, and my wife and children: I do not wish to go free,” 20:6 his master shall take him before Elohim. He shall be brought to the door or the doorpost, and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl; and he shall then remain his slave for life.
While rabbinic interpretation has become normative in traditional circles, the desire to find an interpretation closer to the plain sense of the text (peshuto shel miqra) has led even traditional commentators to offer alternative suggestions closer to the plain sense of the text. Such is the case with classical commentators like Rashbam and Bekhor Shor, known as pashtanim or plain sense commentators. For example, on the verse “she shall not be freed as male slaves are” (21:7) Rashbam glosses “[at the end of ] six years,” an interpretation that disagrees with rabbinic halakhah, which infers from this verse that she does not get her freedom in the same way Canaanite slaves do, namely, the loss of an eye or a tooth gouged or broken by his master; on the verse “in the seventh year he shall go free” (21:2), Bekhor Shor explains that it refers to the seventh year of the agricultural cycle, a time during which a land holder is not in need of labor, contra rabbinic opinion, which believe that it refers to the seventh year of his enslavement. For a survey of additional examples, see Torah Shelemah, an anthology of rabbinic midrashim, edited by M.M. Kasher, volume 17, Excursus 22, p. 298. For taking into account historical circumstances in peshuto shel miqra readings, compare Maimonides, Sefer haMitzvot, Positive Commandments 20 and 34.
David Wright argues that the law addresses the average Israelite who would be in a position to buy, as opposed to the minority who would be selling themselves. See, David P. Wright, Inventing God’s Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 124-125.
In theory, six years could be a statute of limitations, but then perhaps the law should have said something along the lines of “despite there being an outstanding debt.” More significantly, what about the case where the debt can be repaid in one year, why impose a six year term? Here, the statute of limitations works against the slave, and what started as a humane piece of legislation would turn into an oppressive one! The rabbis, who felt constrained to identify the eved ivri with a freeman sold by a court to make restitution for theft, needed to make sense of the six-year limit. See m. Kiddushin 1:2. They assigned to each year of servitude one sixth of the total to be worked off; see Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Avadim 2:8.
This is done in great detail in David Wright’s above referenced work, Inventing God’s Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
The opening of Hammurabi’s law here is much more reminiscent of Leviticus 25:39 than Exodus:
וְכִי יָמוּךְ אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ וְנִמְכַּר לָךְ…
If your kinsman under you continues in straits and must sell himself to you…
Nevertheless, the three-year limit of Hammurabi’s law seems to be related to Exodus’ six-year limit.
Technical note: In grammatical terms, when eved is what a person becomes after he is sold, we say that eved is the effected object. In other words, he wasn’t an eved when the process started, but he is when it ends. When, however, a person is already a slave and someone acquires him, then we say that eved is the affected object. The former usage is rare, and occurs almost exclusively with a verb of the same root. Bernard Levinson, however, argues that “the ‘effected object’ should not be restricted to cognate objects,” i.e., proleptic use can even occur with words that are not the same root. See, Bernard Levinson, “The ‘Effected Object’ in contractual legal language: The Semantics of ‘If you purchase a Hebrew Slave’ (Exodus 21:2a),” VT 4 (October 2006): 485-504. Even if one were to accept his argument, the rarity of the proleptic use inclines us to treat eved in this instance as an affected object, i.e., already a slave at the time of sale.
Deuteronomy 15:12 presents an instructive contrast: “if a fellow ivri or ivriyah is sold to you….” The person selling himself is an ivri (male) or ivriyah (female). They are not designated as slaves, as they are in Exodus, and the reason is because they only become slaves after they are sold. This also suggests that there is a fundamental difference between the Exodus and the Deuteronomy legislation. See below.
See William H.C. Propp’s commentary to the Anchor Series Exodus, p. 186, admitting that “although there is room for doubt, tradition is probably correct.” For a bibliography of those agreeing with this view, see Gregory C. Chirichigno, Debt Slavery in Israel and the Ancient Near East (JSOTSup 141; Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1993), 205, n.1.
After citing the “words of the heretics” in both his short and long commentaries on Exodus 21:2, Ibn Ezra spends a considerable amount of time rebutting their arguments. One might rightly entertain the suspicion that Ibn Ezra was drawn on logical grounds to their interpretation but felt obligated by the weight of tradition to defend the rabbinic position at all costs. Be that as it may, Ibn Ezra concludes his disquisition by offering the traditional view that the slave in question is an Israelite freeman sold by the courts to make good on theft (as per Exodus 22:2).
In theory, one could answer by saying that it is a demonstration of “family values,” similar to the command not to abhor an Edomite (Deut. 23:8) or not to conquer the land of Edomites, Moabites, and Ammonites (Deut. 2:5, 9, 19).
Mary P. Gray makes the case for a connection between ivri slavery and the Ḥabiru:
Comparisons with the Nuzi contracts indicate such striking similarities that one may conclude that the same non-ethnic group of “immigrants” forced into slavery by the social conditions they faced in the land as a minority group, are involved in both the biblical texts and the Habiru documents. These (Nuzi) contracts are real contracts involving mutual rights and guarantees. Such contracts would scarcely be necessary between a ruler and captured people. (ibid. 76).
See, Mary P. Gray, “The Habiru-Hebrew Problem in the Light of the Source Material Available at Present,” Hebrew Union College Annual, Vol. 29 (1958): 185. That said, it is worth noting that despite the Nuzi documents offering the closest parallels to the eved ivri legislation, they evince contracts undertaken and negotiated willingly by servants and masters. The Torah, however, legislates fixed six-year terms. One wonders why the outcomes of these laws turned out so different and who would benefit from such legislation.
Here I am also building on the insights of the Belgian Bible scholar, Edward Lipiński, in “L’Esclave Hebreu,” VT 26.1 (January 1976): 120-124, by adducing internal biblical evidence. Lipiński’s linguistic and comparative analysis anticipates mine, but we differ in some important details.
Ivri (and ivriyah) appears again in Jer 34:9, 14, again only as part of the term “Hebrew slave.”
Whether the CC begins with the Hebrew slave law in 21:1 or with the laws of the altar in 20:18 is actually a matter of debate. I work with the former assumption though this is not the place to discuss the pros and cons. Either way, the law follows immediately after the superscription in 21:1, so if it isn’t the first law in the CC, it is the first in the list of laws following the introduction “these are the laws” in the CC.
See, for example, the explanations of Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides, ad loc., who, unaware of the problematics presented by other Near Eastern codes, still felt a need to offer a reason why mishpatim began with the laws of an ivri slave. Their justifications still look like cases of explanations after the fact. If we are willing to accept, however, the idea that the placement of the law of eved ivri at the head of the CC is merely redactional and it was never an intrinsic part of the CC, then the above reasons offer credible justification for the placement.
See Torah Shelemah, excursus to Parashat Vaera, p. 116. After citing another similar but obscure midrash, the anthologist and editor suggests that even in the years of oppression there were well-to-do Israelites who owned slaves! Exodus 12:44 implies that Israelites had slaves, thus they are commanded to circumcise them before they can eat from the Passover sacrifice. Isaac Sassoon’ reading, in his “Did Israel Celebrate their Freedom While Owning Slaves?” (TheTorah.com, 2015), that the verse implies “that the Israelites were not allowed to exit their own serfdom before …acquiring slaves and circumcising them” is too strong and not necessary. It does imply, however, that Israelites already owned slaves. See also the comments of Meir Simcha of Dvinsk on Exodus 6:13, who on the basis of a midrash in Numbers Rabbah, Naso 13:8, that says that the tribes of Reuben, Simeon and Levi “lorded” over their brethren, concludes that these tribes acquired Israelite slaves, sold to them by the Egyptians.
Contra Bernard Jackson, who argues that the CC is made up of multiple blocks of laws, and that the slave law was integral to what was once an independent unit from 21:2-27, and which has a chiastic structure. See, Bernard S. Jackson, “Modelling Biblical Law: The Covenant Code,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 79 (1995): 1745-1827 [1778-1779].
Contra Benno Jacob, who in a moment of excessive piety declared that “there were no Hebrew (by which he meant, Israelite) slaves. A person whose bondage is limited cannot be a slave.” Benno Jacob, The Second Book of the Bible: Exodus (trans. by Walter Jacob in association with Yakov Elman; Hoboken, NJ, 1992). Jacob failed to see the difference between the eved ivri and the Israelite theft-slave.
Leviticus 25:39-40 describes another type of bondage, that of debt (accrued honestly), but urges that an Israelite who sells himself out of economic necessity be treated as a “hired or bound labourer,” not as a slave.
Some scholars have sought to emend the protasis in a number of ways to solve this problem. See Sara Japhet, “The Relationship between the Legal Corpora in the Pentateuch in Light of Manumission Laws,” Scripta Hierosolymitania 31 (ed. Sara Japhet; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1986), 71, where she cites Alt and Jebsen but dismisses their suggestions. Alt’s emendation was adopted by Niels Peter Lemche, “The ‘Hebrew Slave’: Comments on the Slave Law Exodus 21:2-11,” VT 25.2 (April 1975): 129-144 [135-136, 143], but see E. Lipinski’s, op. cit., categoric rebuttal, on linguistic grounds. On the whole, these suggestions appear forced and have not generally been well received.
David Wright argues that the law was written in the second person to connect it with the laws in 20:18-23, which are addressed to the national community. Wright, Inventing, 124-125.
See Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1992): 282-283. Weinfeld attributes this more humane treatment to Deuteronomy’s “moral and humanistic character.” But the reason in this case may simply be that Deuteronomy deals with an Israelite free man whereas Exod. 21:2 deals with an Israelite kin but not necessarily an Israelite. The bold idea that Deuteronomy, or more precisely, Moses, created new law reinterpreting previous legislation is already adumbrated by such traditional exegetes as Nachmanides. See my article, “The Explanatory Commandments: Ramban’s Daring and Creative Contribution to the Parshanut of the Book of Deuteronomy,” Hakira 13 (Spring 2012), 65-95.
It appears that, at least initially, as I argued in “Who were the Hebrews?” (TheTorah.com, 2017), the ivri was an Israelite who sold himself to a foreigner. Leviticus 25:39-44 addresses itself to those seeking economic security by selling themselves to Israelites. Yet Jeremiah 34:9-10 appeals to the slave owners in Jerusalem to release the irivri–yehudi slaves in accordance with the Exodus/Deuteronomy laws of the eved ivri prescribing a six-year term, strangely unaware of the Leviticus regulations. J. Lewy, “Origin and Signification of the Biblical Term ‘Hebrew,’” HUCA 28 (1957): 3, asserts that the ivri of Ex. 21:2 could not be an Israelite because Leviticus 25:44 demands that Israelites acquire slaves only from their surrounding nations, but he fails to take Jeremiah 34:9-10 into account. As an aside, it is not clear that Leviticus 25:44 forbids the acquisition of an Israelite who had been enslaved by foreigners.