Gobelins by Marc Chagall in the foyer of the Knesset in Jerusalem. © Irina Opachevsky /123RF
Modern Faith in Sinai
Notwithstanding modern day biblical critical and historical critical claims, applying the tools of contemporary philosophy demonstrates how room still exists to have faith that something extraordinary happened to our ancestors and that this event had a permanent effect on the development of Torah and Judaism.
Published: March 30, 2016
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Last Updated: September 7, 2026
Daniel Howard-Snyder, ‘Propositional Faith: What it is and what it is not’, American Philosophical Quarterly (2013), 50/4: 357-372
To clarify my methods: One legacy of Ordinary Language Philosophy (a movement from the middle of the last century) is that analytical philosophers will often appeal to whether a certain way of speaking rings strangely in the ears of native speakers or not. If the word “faith” would jar in the ears of most English speakers, when you say, for instance that “I have faith that the Red Sox will win even though I hope they don’t” then that ‘linguistic infelicity’ is data. The fact that it would strike most English speakers as wrong to deny that the word “faith” could apply to the person in this thought experiment is also data. Thus, when I use notions like “seems wrong” or “appropriate,” I am appealing to that sort of linguistic felicity. This is a common move by analytic philosophers, even though we know longer count ourselves as Ordinary Language Philosophers (I admit that this method can be misused and can sometimes seem too subjective, but my use of this method here seems to be fair as well as standard).
It has been argued that Maimonides demands belief in all thirteen of his principles of faith. Indeed, Menachem Kellner has argued that, according to Maimonides, you should know the truth of the thirteen principle because he thought that each and every principle was demonstrable. However, this is incompatible with Maimonides as he’s presented in Marc Shapiro’s book on the Limits of Orthodox Theology, in which it’s argued that Maimonides himself didn’t believe that you were really a heretic if you quibbled with some of the principles.
This principle gets its name from Rabbi Yehuda Halevi’s set of philosophical dialogues, called The Kuzari. The principle is alluded to, though not particularly developed in part I, paragraph 25. A similar argument was also proffered by Saadya Gaon in the introduction to Emunot Vadeot.
See for example, Guy Kahane, ‘Should we want God to exist?’, Philosophical and Phenomenlogical Research (2010) 82/3: 674-696
What is an authentic evolution? That’s certainly a good question. Christianity, Islam and all of the branches of Judaism might claim to be an authentic evolution of that moment in Sinai. I think that a person who has profound religious experiences through the engagement with Christianity would probably have good warrant to believe that their religion was just such an authentic evolution, even the only authentic evolution, as is preached by many Churches. But, likewise, a person whose profound religious experiences are bound up with engagement in halakhic observance and the life of Orthodox Judaism, would have equally good warrant to believe, or at least to have faith, that their religion was the authentic evolution of the religion that started at Sinai. A more thorough investigation of the notion of an authentic evolution would take us beyond the contours of a sketch, and into the thorny philosophical issue of the identity of religions over time.
J. Siegel, The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp: Desire, Liberation and the Self in Modern Culture, 1995, University of California Press
Which, for the record, I don’t! I cannot claim any expertise, but from what I’ve seen of the evidence, I am left underwhelmed. I don’t deny the narrative. I’m merely a skeptic.
For more on the notion of God’s appropriating humanly written text, and imbuing each letter with Divine significance, and for the traditional sources that speak to such a process, see Michael Harris’ new book, Faith without Fear (Chapter 4).
When Hud Hudson wrote his book, The Fall and Hypertime, he was using contemporary metaphysical approaches to time, to defend what even he would recognize to be a somewhat unlikely literalism about the Garden of Eden. This book isn’t a work of religious extremism or apologetics. It is a philosophy book published by Oxford University Press. Eleonore Stump’s, Wandering in Darkness, is a work that engages with contemporary neuro-science, philosophy of literature, metaphysics and more, to articulate a thoughtful Christian response to the problem of Evil.
The claim that this wouldn’t be academic seems like a type of academic provincialism emanating from the world of traditional Jewish studies – a provincialism that would deny the title of “academic” to some of the great Christian philosophers and theologians of our times. If it is ‘academic’ to ask how a particular thesis of Cartesian metaphysics can stand up to scrutiny, and if it is ‘academic’ to extract a claim from the Dialogues of Plato and then to defend them as philosophically well-motivated, then why isn’t it academic to ask how a particular tenet of a religious faith might stand up to scrutiny, or to extract a claim from a Hassidic treatise, and then to defend it as philosophically well-motivated? The sort of Jewish philosophy that I envisage has every right to a place in the academy.