To Protect Second Marriages, Deuteronomy Renders Palingamy Taboo

Druze family law imposes severe restrictions on the relationship between a man and his former wife, providing insight into the biblical prohibition of palingamy—a man remarrying his ex-wife, if she has married someone else in the interim.

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"To Protect Second Marriages, Deuteronomy Renders Palingamy Taboo." TheTorah.com, August 12, 2026. https://www.thetorah.com/article/protecting-second-marriages-deuteronomy-renders-palingamy-taboo.

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"To Protect Second Marriages, Deuteronomy Renders Palingamy Taboo" (2026, August 12). TheTorah.com. https://www.thetorah.com/article/protecting-second-marriages-deuteronomy-renders-palingamy-taboo

To Protect Second Marriages, Deuteronomy Renders Palingamy Taboo

Giving a Bill of Divorce Customs (adapted) Augustin Calmet, Antique 18th Cent. Wikimedia

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Ki Teitzei

Published: August 12, 2026

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Last Updated: October 28, 2026

  1. See Nissim Dana, The Druze in the Middle East: Their Faith, Leadership, Identity, and Status (Sussex Academic Press, 2003). The origins of the faith date to the 11th century C.E., with a religious figure named "Al-Hakim" who was also the sixth caliph of the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt (3). Dana notes that the Druze faith is "not a ritual-ceremonial faith" but rather a "neo-platonic philosophy" (17). It rejects several aspects of Islam, for example, the five daily prayers, fasting on Ramadan, and the haj to Mecca (18). In 2003, they numbered about one million (99).

  2. The Druze law of personal status in Israel (adopted in 1961) is based on statutes approved by Lebanon's parliament in 1948. One exception regards what actions determine the finality of divorce. In the Lebanese version, divorce is final with the verdict of the Qadi (religious judge); this is article 38 of the "Personal Status Laws of the Druze Sect in Lebanon" (Lubna Tarabey, Family Law in Lebanon: Marriage and Divorce among the Druze [I.B. Tauris, 2013], 221). In contrast, the version adopted by the Druze Religious Courts in Israel dictates that a divorce comes into force as soon as the husband announces before witnesses that he is divorcing his wife, without the ruling of a Qadi (Dana, The Druze, 133).

  3. "Palingamy" is the term used by Reuven Yaron, one of the legal scholars discussed in this essay, for remarriage between two people who were previously married to each other. It is composed of the Greek "palin," meaning "again" or "back," and "gamy," from Greek "gamos" meaning "marriage."

  4. Dana, The Druze, 138. The irrevocability of the divorce is the norm, but everyday practice admits the restoration of a marriage before the divorce has become final. In addition to the two standards indicated in note 2, another standard for some Druze legalists is when the last of the wife's belongings have been removed from her husband's home and his first payment of standard divorce payments has been made. For a detailed view of this issue, see Aharon Layish, "The Prohibition of Reinstating a Divorced Wife in the Druze Family," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 41 (1978): 259-261, 265.

  5. Layish, "The Prohibition," 260, 270.

  6. Layish, "The Prohibition," 262.

  7. Tarabey, Family Law, 100. Of course, some couples attempt in various ways to evade the harsh demands of the law; see Layish, "The Prohibition," 261-262.

  8. Layish, The Prohibition," 264.

  9. Layish, The Prohibition," 264.

  10. Lubna Tarabey, Family Law, 172-173.

  11. Layish, "The Prohibition," 260.

  12. These verses read:

    דברים כד:א כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבְעָלָהּ וְהָיָה אִם לֹא תִמְצָא חֵן בְּעֵינָיו כִּי מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר וְכָתַב לָהּ סֵפֶר כְּרִיתֻת וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ. כד:ב וְיָצְאָה מִבֵּיתוֹ וְהָלְכָה וְהָיְתָה לְאִישׁ אַחֵר. כד:ג וּשְׂנֵאָהּ הָאִישׁ הָאַחֲרוֹן וְכָתַב לָהּ סֵפֶר כְּרִיתֻת וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ אוֹ כִי יָמוּת הָאִישׁ הָאַחֲרוֹן אֲשֶׁר לְקָחָהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה.
    Deut 24:1 A man takes a wife and possesses her. She fails to please him because he finds something obnoxious about her and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house; 24:2 she leaves his household and becomes the wife of another man; 24:3 then this latter man rejects her, writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house; or the man who married her last dies.

    Bible translations are from NJPS with modifications. For a detailed discussion of this law, see Eve Levavi Feinstein, “Remarrying Your Ex-Wife,” TheTorah (2017).

  13. The claim that the divorcee has been defiled (הטמאה) should not be understood in a general sense, but rather that as a consequence of her second marriage, she is prohibited from remarriage to her first husband (and thus in some sense she is defiled in relation to him). There are no restrictions on her marrying anyone else.

  14. We need not assume that the stipulations included in this law should be generalized for every case of divorce in ancient Israel, as the purpose here is to prohibit remarriage after the woman has been married to a different man. For more on what we do know about divorce in ancient Israel, see Eve Levavi Feinstein, “When Is a Man Allowed to Divorce His Wife?”

  15. For adultery and defilement (טמא), see Num 5:11-29; for various kinds of illicit sex (including adultery, incest, male-male sexual relations, and bestiality) and defilement, with the label “abomination” (תועבה), see Leviticus 18, especially v. 24-30; for defilement (of the land) as the result of murder, see Num 35:33-34. For the use of the term "abomination" for the worship of other gods, see Deut 7:25; 12:31, 27:15.

  16. These are only a selection, briefly discussed. For a more detailed discussion of the various explanations that have been offered (including those not discussed, such as S.R. Driver’s suggestion that the intent of the law was to safeguard against a hasty or arbitrary divorce) and the strengths and weaknesses of each, see Feinstein, “Remarrying Your Ex-Wife,” as well as J. Carl Laney, “Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and the Issue of Divorce,” The Bibliotheca Sacra 149 (1992): 3-15; David I. Brewer, "Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and the Origin of the Jewish Divorce Certificate," Journal of Jewish Studies 49 (1998): 230-243; G. J. Wenham, "The Restoration of Marriage Reconsidered," Journal of Jewish Studies 30 (1979): 36-40; Carolyn Pressler, The View of Women Found in the Deuteronomic Family Laws (W. de Gruyter, 1993), 45-62; and Moshe A. Zipor, "Divorce and Restoration of Marriage," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 20 (2014): 127-140.

  17. Translations of rabbinic texts are the author’s own or from the editors.

  18. Some modern interpreters have also suggested this reasoning behind the law, including Roy Gane, "Old Testament Principles Relating to Divorce and Remarriage," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 12 (2001): 35-61 (52-53), and P.C. Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy; NICOT (Eerdmans, 1976) 305, who comments, "If divorce became too easy, then it could be abused and it would become a 'legal' form of committing adultery." The plain sense of the text, on the other hand, contradicts this line of reasoning, as verses 1 and 3 state explicitly that both husbands desire to divorce their wife because of their dissatisfaction, not because they desire for some reason to "share." Further, verse 3 sees the woman as an active agent in her marital affairs as she goes and marries another man rather than being pandered by her husband.

  19. Related to this is the argument that there really is no such thing as divorce. Theoretically, the husband could have taken back his wife after he divorced her, but the interim marriage rendered her "defiled" because of the ideal expressed in Genesis 2:24, that marriage renders two people "one flesh." Thus, divorce is illusory; it cannot disrupt the essential unity of the couple. Sexual relations with any other man while her husband is still alive renders the woman off-limits for remarriage. See E. Lovestam, "Divorce and Remarriage in the New Testament," The Jewish Law Annual 4 (1981): 47-65. Support for this view is reflected in the Qumran scrolls and the Gospel of Mark (10:2-12), where Jesus of Nazareth insists that the prohibition of divorce goes back to the creation of humanity. See also Matt 5:31-32, Luke 16:18, and 1 Cor 7:10-11. Some in the Qumran sect also condemned divorce: The Damascus Document (CD), column 4, mentions those

    ...ניתפשים בשתים בזנות לקחת שתי נשים בחייהם ויסוד הבריאה זכר ונקבה ברא אותם ..
    CD 4:19-5:1 …who are caught twice in fornication: by taking two wives in their lives, even though the principle of creation is "male and female He created them."

    Translation from F. Garcia Martinez, ed., The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated: The Qumran Texts in English, trans. William G.E. Watson (Brill, 1994), 36. Ultimately, however, this explanation for the prohibition of remarriage fails because Deuteronomy has no intention to delegitimize divorce nor even express disapproval of it; she is free to find a third or even a fourth husband; she is simply prohibited to remarry her first.

  20. This is not explicit in the Bible, but it is implied by Numbers 5's emphasis on the adulteress being defiled/impure. See also Ezekiel 18:6,11,15; 33:26. In rabbinic law, it is found in Mishnah Sota 5:1.

  21. Pressler, The View of Women Found in the Deuteronomic Family Laws, 60-61, reasons that, "we are pushed to interpret the relationship prohibited by the law as analogous to adultery. Adultery involves a woman having sexual relations with man A, then man B, then again man A. Deut 24:1-4 prohibits just such a pattern of sexual relations, even when the first and second relationships were legally contracted and legally dissolved." Mordechai Friedman, "Reinstatement of One's Ex-Wife Following Her Remarriage, and the Impurity of an Adulteress and a Rape Victim," in Saul Lieberman Memorial Volume, ed. Shamma Friedman (JTS, 1993), 189-195 [Hebrew], sees the prohibition of palingamy as rooted in the "absolute nature" of adultery in Israelite law. According to this reasoning, while the woman's marital life may include even a third or fourth husband, once she returns to her previous husband, her subsequent marriages count as adulterous retroactively. This view, however, is problematic because it posits that a law code can ignore the legal nature of the wife's second marriage. In the words of Reuven Yaron, "The Restoration of Marriage," Journal of Jewish Studies 17 (1966): 1-11 (6-7), "She acted in a perfectly legal manner, marrying another husband after being dismissed by the first. A crime cannot be committed in a lawful fashion."

  22. Don Isaac Abrabanel quotes Ralbag (Levi ben Gershon, Gersonides) in his commentary on Deut 24:4; Ralbag expresses different ideas in his commentary (Ralbag on the Torah, Venice edition, 1759, volume 2, 233, found at https://hebrewbooks.org/19194).

  23. In this scenario, a man uses his wife to gain access to the wealth of her second husband, but it is unclear how he can be certain that the second man would marry her or divorce her and that she would leave with any wealth. Nevertheless, his explanation focusses on the first husband's greed as the motive in divorcing his wife and then taking her back.

  24. Raymond Westbrook, "The Prohibition of the Restoration of Marriage in Deuteronomy 24:1-4," in Studies in Bible, ed. Sara Japhet (Magnes, 1986), 387-405. This, according to Weinfeld, prompts Deuteronomy to label the remarriage an "abomination" (תועבה). Westbook references Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Clarendon, 1972), 269, who wrote that the term תועבה in Deuteronomy is used to emphasize "the hypocritical attitude of the malefactor." This principle would apply to the motivation for remarriage as reconstructed by Westbrook. He introduces the legal principle of estoppel, which precludes a person from profiting by asserting a particular set of facts which are contrary to his/her previous assertions.

  25. His grounds for divorce are based on the supposedly grave accusation of ערות דבר, erwat dabar (v.1). For a discussion of this phrase and the various ways it has been interpreted, see Feinstein, "When Is a Man Allowed to Divorce His Wife?" TheTorah (2018).

  26. Westbrook, “The Prohibition of the Restoration of Marriage,” 404. Westbrook’s interpretation, however, raises questions about the application of the law. Does the law prohibit remarriage only in cases in which the first husband profits from taking his wife back? If the first husband was wealthy and the second husband poor, could the former take back his wife? Would there be a specific judge or accountant to whom the first husband and his divorcee would appeal? If Westbrook's interpretation is correct, does the prohibition of remarriage apply when this is not the case? This specific application of the law runs contrary to practicality, but also its interpretation in early Jewish law, where it is taken as a blanket prohibition of remarriage after an interim union. Jer 3:1-2, our earliest interpretation of Deut 24:1-4, seems to have such an understanding. For this thought, see Zipor, “Divorce and Restoration of Marriage,” 137, who comments that Westbrook's “approach runs contrary to the legal and exegetical tradition at least starting from Jeremiah,” who understood the law as a blanket prohibition.

  27. Yaron, “The Restoration of Marriage,” 1–11. Those who object to this interpretation contend that Yaron "fails to account for the provision that the law applies if the second husband dies" (Feinstein, "Remarrying Your Ex-Wife"; see also Westbrook, "The Prohibition of Restoration of Marriage," 390; G.J. Wenham, "The Restoration of Marriage Reconsidered," 37). On the other hand, the wife and her first husband could be waiting for the death of her second husband to remarry and he or she may passively or actively contribute to this inevitability. Alternatively, the second husband believes this to be so. David's marriage to Abigail might exemplify a similar situation (1 Samuel 25); Zipor, "Divorce and Restoration of Marriage," 134, notes that this kind of theme is very common in world literature.

  28. Leviticus 18:24–30.

  29. Leviticus 20:11,12, 14; for karet (Lev 18:29; 20:17), see Jacob Milgrom, Numbers (Doubleday, 2000), Excursus 36, "The Penalty of 'Karet,'" 405-408; he holds that the term can refer to the termination of the offender's line or the offender's inability to join his ancestors in the afterlife. Prohibited sexual relations in Leviticus 18 and 20 are not limited to incest, but also include acts such as adultery, male-male sexual relations, and bestiality.

  30. Leviticus 18:24–30; 26:14–38. This last is on the collective level.

  31. While we might assume a universal loathing for marriage with half-siblings, this is apparently not so in the Bible (Gen 20:12; 2 Samuel 13) nor in parts of the ancient world: Children of the same father but different mothers were considered less closely related in a large patrilineal household. The Torah's ban on male homosexuality, unique in the ancient world, is another example of a sexual taboo that is unique to particular societies (Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, 1566). Today first cousin marriage is considered objectionable in Western Europe and its cultural descendants, due to the influence of a first-cousin taboo in Catholic law. In other parts of the world, perhaps 10-20% of marriages take place between first cousins. See Alan Bittles, "Consanguinity and Its Relevance to Clinical Genetics," Clinical Genetics 60 (2001): 89-98 (90).

  32. The former wife is labeled hutama’ah (הטמאה), a unique form of the root טמא, "to defile/be impure" (a passive form of the hitpa‘el, called a hotpa‘al). The root appears eight times in Deuteronomy and six times just in Leviticus 18 and 20. Deut 24:4's use of the root חטא in the hiphil with "the land" as its object is suggestive of defilement; see its parallel in Jer 3:2 with חנף which refers to pollution. The relative clause "which YHWH your God is giving you an as inheritance" suggests that it is the land itself is the object.