The tattoo is a quote from the Mishnah (Abot 5:23) לפום צערא אגרא, "according to the effort is the reward." Photo courtesy of the author.
Tattoos - What Exactly Is Prohibited?
It is widely assumed that the Torah prohibits all tattoos. And yet, a look at the verse in context yields alternative understandings.
Published: April 20, 2021
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Last Updated: September 7, 2026
Season 3, Episode 6, October 20, 2002.
Some descendants of concentration camp survivors tattoo their own arms with their relatives’ numbers, as a memorial, a personal and embodied Yad VaShem. They view embracing tattoos as a way for Jews to take back our power and erase our victimhood. See discussion of this on Jewish Values Online.
Attestations of כְתֹ֣בֶת in rabbinic literature are confined to tattoo references and citations of Lev 19:28 (Lev Rab. 19:6; b. Gittin 20b, and m. Makkot 3:6/b. Makkot 21a, see below). It seems that כְתֹבֶת, with the tattoo connotation, fell out of Hebrew idiom, and assumed a wholly different identity in modern usage (as “address”).
See BDB, s.v. קַעֲקַע, 891; HALOT s.v. קַעֲקַע, §8442. The rabbinic corpus evinces wider usage of קַעֲקַע and derivatives, always with the duplicative form, and a semantic range encompassing “demolish, pierce, press, stamp.” Medieval exegetes reach for biblical verbs that have קע as second and third radicals, and, that dovetail, somehow, with the notion of piercing, or embedding into, the skin, inherent in the way tattoos are affixed. Rashi cites הוֹקַע, הוֹקַעֲנוּם (Num 25:4, 2 Sam 21:6, “impale,” root יקע ). Ibn Ezra refers to the same Phinehas verse as well as רֹקַע (“beat, spread, expand,” Isaiah 42:5). In the 19th century, Shadal suggested that קעקע is קרוב לשרש, “related to the root[s]” תקע (“stab, strike, thrust,” as with a sword or dagger, or sharp tool, e.g. Judg 3:21, 4:21), and שקע, “sink.” This would fit with the view expressed by the grammarian Wilhelm Gesenius, an older contemporary of Shadal, that some triliteral roots do have an older biliteral base, what he calls the radix primaria. See Wilhelm Gesenius and Emil Kautzsch, Genesius’ Hebrew Grammar, Revised and Expanded, Second English Edition, trans. Arthur E. Cowley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909; orig., Wilhelm Gesenius, Hebräische Grammatik [Hale, 1813]), 100–101 [§30, f–h].
I am grateful to Keith Lewinstein, Professor of Islamic History at Bridgewater State University, for a brainstorming session about Saadia’s Judeo-Arabic.
לִרְשַׁם חָרִית צִיוּרָא “to mark a figure through incision” may represent a later gloss on כְתַב חָקִיק “engraved writing,” since the earlier Targum Neofiti, from the same Targumic tradition as Pseudo-Jonathan, has כְתַב חָקִיק alone.
The Tosefta here strikes me as more theoretical than operational, as it is hard to conceive of an “accidental,” tattoo scenario, unless we imagine a rabbinic bacchanal, equivalent to a modern AEPi initiation (note the Meanads representing Fall on the standard Roman era synagogue floor mosaic, and the Tzippori mansion’s mural of the drinking context between Heracles and Dionysis). Moses Maimonides, however, in his codification of the law in the Mishneh Torah, Sefer Mada, “Laws of Idolatry” 12:11 does include this as a mitigating factor:
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּכוֹתֵב אֲבָל זֶה שֶׁכָּתְבוּ בִּבְשָׂרוֹ וְקִעְקְעוּ בּוֹ אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן סִיֵּעַ כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה. אֲבָל אִם לֹא עָשָׂה כְּלוּם אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה.
These matters [the Biblical/Mishnaic/Talmudic prohibitions] are said about the one who writes- but the one on whose flesh is written and incised -- they are not guilty unless they aided in order that it is done.
See Gordon Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, NICOT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979); and Meir Bar Ilan, “Body Marks in Jewish Sources: From Biblical to Post-Talmudic Times,” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 21.1 (2018): 57–81. Bar Ilan also proposes a number of other Pentateuchal references to body marking in a ritual context (Num 6:22–27, the Decalogue’s third commandment [Exod 20:7; Deut 5:11], Exod 13:9, 16, Deut 6:8, 11:18). However, he sees these as instances of writing rather than permanent incisions or tattoos.
For a discussion about this Hellenistic ethos, and the implication for the practice of circumcision, see David Bernat, “Circumcision as Purification,” TheTorah (2015); idem, “Circumcision: Is the Foreskin a Defect?” TheTorah (2017).
In contrast to his contemporary, Rashbam, ibn Ezra explicitly states that it is illegitimate to interpret the laws of the Torah against the rabbinic legal understanding. See discussion in Zev Farber, “Can Torah Contradict Halacha?” TheTorah (2013). This would account for his reticence to own the interpretation here.
On “semi-poetry” as a hallmark of style in certain legal material, see Marjo Korpel, “The Epilogue to the Holiness Code,” in Verse in the Ancient Near East, ed. Johannes de Moor and W. Watston (Neukirchen-Vleuyn: Neukirchener, 1993), 107–122; and especially Meir Paran, Forms of the Priestly Style in the Pentateuch (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1989), 98–136 (Hebrew).
The translation above is mine. The original reads:
.כל ארבעת האיסורים הללו באים להזהיר מפני נזקי גוף הנעשים לכבוד המתים, לשם אבלות או פולחן מתים
Baruch J. Schwartz, תורת הקדושה [The Holiness Legislation] (Jerusalem: Magnes/Hebrew University, 1999), 343–348 [p. 346].
Editor’s note: On the issue of hair removal, see Rabbi Zev Farber, “The Prohibition of Shaving in the Torah and Halacha,” TheTorah (2014).
While most of his intertextual insights are compelling, he brings no direct parallels to כְתֹבֶת קַעֲקַע.
In the same vein, within the set of laws in verses 26–28, לֹא תֹאכְלוּ עַל־הַדָּם in verse 26 does not display a prima facie association with the dead or their spirits. In fact, where the blood prohibition occurs in Gen 9:1–7, Lev 17:10–14, Deut 12:13–16 and 1 Sam 14:31–35, its rationale, when articulated, is unrelated to mourning or necromancy.
Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, AB 3A (New York: Random House Doubleday, 2000), 1695.
See CAD, s.v. šimtu. See also Victor Hurowitz, “His Master Shall Pierce his Ear with an Awl [Exodus 21:6]: Marking Slaves in the Bible in Light of Akkadian Sources,” PAAJR 58 (1992): 47–77; and, Isaac Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East (New York: Oxford, 1949), 42–49.
Arthur E. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1923), no. 28, line 6; cf. Emil G. Kraeling, The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953), no. 5, for the same formulation.
As per Philo, Special Laws, 1:58; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1695; and “Jews and Tattoos: The Biblical Body as Canvas. Interview with Nili S. Fox,” Reform Judaism (Summer 2014): 34–35. Fox and others also posit the “Mark of Cain” and Ezek 9:4 as tattoo references, though I find this less sure.
Such theological “role reversals” are emblematic of Second Isaiah. See also Isa 52:6, 58:9, 65:1, where YHWH responds to the people’s appeals and needs by declaring הִנֵּֽנִי “Here I Am”; and the discussion in Ben Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture: Allusion in Isaiah 40-66 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 91, 250 n. 50. A similar metaphor of divine dedication is evident in the Talmud (b. Ber 6a) where YHWH’s Tefillin is imagined as housing a parchment with biblical verses proclaiming the Israelite nation’s uniqueness.
On the virtual “debates” between the authorial schools responsible for Leviticus and Second Isaiah, see Moshe Weinfeld, “האל הבורא בבראשית א ובנבואת ישעיהו השני” [God the Creator in Gen. 1 and the Prophecy of Second Isaiah], Tarbiz 37 (1968): 105–132; idem, “God the Creator in the Priestly Source and Deutero-Isaiah,” in Moshe Weinfeld, The Place of the Law in the Religion of Ancient Israel, VTsupp 100 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 95–117.
See Laws of Hammurabi, §226–227. See also the discussion of this practice in CAD, s.v. abbuttu.
See, for example, Isa 43:1; Jer 2:20; Ps 113:1; 2 Chr 12:7–9. David Daube, The Exodus Pattern in the Bible (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), 42–46, suggests that the motif of the “change of master” from Pharaoh to YHWH is a component of the broader Exodus pattern that pervades the Hebrew Bible. For cogent summary discussions of the social analogies and systems of metaphor that characterize the YHWH-Israel association, see James C.L. Gibson, Language and Imagery in the Old Testament (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998), 121–138; and Marc Z. Brettler, “The Metaphorical Mapping of God in the Hebrew Bible,” in Metaphor Canon and Community: Jewish, Christian and Islamic Approaches, ed. Ralph Bisschops and James Francis, Religion and Discourse 1 (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), 219–232.
Apropos, Bekhor Shor, and later Malbim, equate circumcision with slave marking. Their rationale is attractive. If the Israelites are God’s slaves, it is the ברית that defines the terms of that servitude. Since circumcision is the sign of the ברית, by associative property, circumcision is the mark of Israel’s enslavement to YHWH. Moreover, slaves have no option to refuse their brand. Likewise, circumcision is practiced upon infants who, by definition, are not consenting parties. Any Israelite who is not circumcised, or fails to have their sons circumcised, warrants the most severe divine penalty of kareit. That said, the circumcision-tattoo analogy does break down. While circumcision functions as a sign for YHWH, i.e. the “owner,” the purpose of a slave brand is to identify the slave to everyone else but the master.
Milgrom also takes his argument concerning tattoos beyond the reach of the evidence when he opines: “It should not be overlooked that this prohibition bans the legally accepted practice of marking a perpetual Israelite slave (Exod 21:6 [SE]; Deut 15:17 [D]).” Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1694. While Lev 25 does seem to eschew the עבד עולם provision for indentured Israelites, the ear-piercing operation cannot be equated to a slave tattoo, or, for that matter, any type of visible or permanent body mark. See my in depth treatment of the issue in David A. Bernat, Sign of the Covenant: Circumcision in the Priestly Tradition (Atlanta: SBL, 2009), 57–59. I maintain that slave marking is instrumental. Only the outcome, the brand, is important and necessary, while the “how” is of little consequence. In contradistinction, the ear piercing is a “legal symbolic act” designed to ritually bind the slave to the household, wherein the process is wholly significant, not any resultant hole in the servant’s ear.