Aaron’s rod devours the serpent of the magicians, attributed to Karel van Mander, 1558. Rijksmuseum
The Ethical Problem of Hardening Pharaoh’s Heart
It seems unethical for God to deny Pharaoh free will and then punish him for his actions. Rashi, Nahmanides, and Maimonides all struggle with this problem, and each assumes that even Pharaoh deserves to be treated fairly.
Published: April 20, 2016
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Last Updated: September 7, 2026
For an affirmative answer, see Yoram Hazony’s The Philosophy of the Hebrew Bible (Cambridge University Press, 2012) and the English translation of my teacher Eliezer Schweid’s The Philosophy of the Bible as Foundation of Jewish Culture (Academic Studies Press, 2009).
The sages throughout the Middle Ages were very cautious about reading the Bible in its naked form, that is, reading it without commentary. We even have cases where prohibitions were rendering forbidding such the practice of reading, or studying, Torah without canonical commentaries. The naked reading of the Torah was relegated to a ritual act performed in the synagogue and not an educational program enacted in the study house.
My reading here is very much in the spirit of Paul Griffiths, Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of Religion (Oxford University Press, 1999).
I dedicate this essay to the birth of my first grandson, Galil Magid.
Source and redaction critics would argue that the two are not from the same pen. For a critical approach to the problem of God’s hardening of Pharaoh’s heart in Exodus, see David Frankel’s TABS essays, "When Pharaoh's Stubbornness Caught God by Surprise," and "Taking Control of the Story: God Hardens Pharaoh's Heart." That said, in this piece I am reading the Torah as a single document.
Again, I am not saying that these presuppositions are factually true, only that they are necessary stances for a philosophical reading.
The only “problem” for critical scholars is when the Bible doesn’t make sense on its own terms. The problems it raises for us as its readers may be a matter of philosophy and theology but not the Bible.
On this see my, “Hasidism: Mystical and Non-Mystical Interpretations of Scripture,” Jewish Mysticism, F. Greenspahn ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 139-158. The Hasidic master R. Jacob Joseph of Polonoy, a disciple of the Baal Shem Tov, expressed this idea by beginning many of his sermons with the well-known rabbinic adage, “Why mention these stories in the Torah? What happened, happened (mah d’havei havei). Why do we need to know this?” While the locution mah d’havei havei appears in rabbinic sources, R. Jacob Joseph deploys it to question the seeming superfluous nature of portions of the biblical narrative. For a discussion of history writing in the Bible and how this was understood by the Rabbis, see, Marc Zvi Brettler, The Creation of History in Ancient Israel (Routledge, 1998), and Isaiah Gafni, “Rabbinic Historiography and Representations of the Past,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature (eds. Charllotte Elisheva Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 295-312.
Rashi, and the Talmudic passage he is invoking, do not quote the verses in full.
“Parashat Vayera,” 3
ויחזק לב פרעה בחמש מכות הראשונות אין כתיב בהן אלא ויחזק לב פרעה כיון שבאו חמש מכות ולא שלח, אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא מכאן ואילך אם רצה לשלוח איני מקבל שכך כתיב בחמש מכות האחרונות ויחזק ה' את לב פרעה.
“And Pharaoh’s heart stiffened” – in the first 5 plagues it only says, “Pharaoh’s heart stiffened.” Once these five passed, and he still refused to send [the Israelites away], the Holy One, blessed be He, said: “From now on, even if you wish to send them away I will not accept it.” For this is what is written regarding the last five plagues, “And God stiffened Pharaoh’s heart.”
Rashi’s prooftext paraphrases a passage in b. Yebamot (63a):
א"ר אלעזר בר אבינא: אין פורענות באה לעולם אלא בשביל ישראל, שנאמר: הכרתי גוים נשמו פנותם החרבתי חוצותם, וכתיב: אמרתי אך תיראי אותי תקחי מוסר.
R. Elazar bar Avina said: “Troubles come to the world only for the sake of Israel, as it says (Zeph 3:6), ‘I wiped out nations: Their corner towers are desolate...’ And it says (Zeph 3:7): ‘And I thought that she would fear Me, Would learn a lesson…’”
According to this passage, God pays no attention to gentiles, even to punish them, except when Israel is concerned. This theology flies in the face of the second postulate stated above, that all people are equal in God’s eyes. Although admittedly, Rashi is making use of this concept, the other two parts of his comment seem aimed to soften this idea, perhaps expressing Rashi’s own ambivalence to the concept.
Rashi’s commentary is almost exclusively built on the adaptation of rabbinic statements. Therefore, it is often difficult to determine what Rashi actually thinks any particular verse means. However, Rashi often includes more than one rabbinic dictum in his comment. In doing so, he juxtaposes two opinions that often represent two distinct rabbinic perspectives. This suggests that Rashi thinks through and with the canonical literature by means of what I am calling juxtapositional reasoning.
The question that remains for Rashi is as follows: If it is the case that Pharaoh would not have repented, since he did not repent (or could not repent), why take away his ability to repent? Even if God had not intervened, Pharaoh’s heart would certainly have hardened on its own accord? Rashi never addresses this issue because, as an exegete, he doesn’t have to. By this I mean that for him the exegetical enterprise is devoted solely to making sense of the verses in question. The issues that arise from a sensible reading, while provocative and important, are beyond the assignment of the exegete. In this comment, Rashi claims to have made sense of two ambiguities: (1) what does the Bible mean when it says God hardened Pharaoh’s heart? And (2) why does the phrase only begin after the fifth plague? Our question as to why he needed to harden his heart in general is not needed to make sense of the verses in question and is thus left unanswered.
While this is a reasonable point, the parity between the slavery of Israel to Pharaoh and Pharaoh’s slavery to God is limited at best. While Pharaoh may have deprived Israel of the free will to determine its fate, God, as absolute ruler, heard Israel’s cry and answered that cry. That is, Israel’s desire to be free was not muted even though they were slaves. Pharaoh, however, being the slave of God, had no recourse to any other authority that could hear his remorse. In Egypt, Israel had agency through prayer and a sovereign who could save them. I would argue that this is different from God hardening Pharaoh’s heart.
I would add that, granted that from the biblical perspective, recognition of God is an absolute good, nevertheless, this point is hard to justify from the vantage point of Pharaoh and the Egyptians. Second, how could Pharaoh have known that what he was doing (enslaving and oppressing Israel) was so egregious? Slavery was normal in the ancient world; is Pharaoh sinful because he did not reject the norms of his society and culture?
Nahmanides does not deal with any of these questions. Perhaps this is due to his unwavering commitment to viewing this episode inside the unfolding story of Israel’s liberation, even as he acknowledges the more theoretical issues of covenantal ethics. That is, Nahmanides recognizes the need to justify God’s action in a way Rashi does not but he does not see the need to justify God’s actions outside this particular narrative.
Maimonides repeats himself often in both sources, although each one, largely due to its intended purpose, offers different nuances and perspectives. In Mishneh Torah, Maimonides is concerned with constructing the parameters of the legal category of repentance and uses the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart as an illustration of the limits of repentance. In the Eight Chapters, Maimonides is concerned with the human disposition and, more specifically for us, the necessity of freewill as a foundation for covenantal responsibility.