Study of a Fetus in the Womb by Leonardo da Vinci, ca. 1511; Talmud tractate Niddah. Wikimedia / 123rf
A Fetus Is Not an Independent Life: Abortion in the Talmud
The rabbis distinguish four stages in the fetus’ development towards personhood. For the duration of the pregnancy, until the commencement of active labor, “a fetus is like its mother’s thigh” (עוּבָּר יֶרֶךְ אִמוֹ).
Published: May 11, 2023
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Last Updated: September 7, 2026
This piece is based on the opening section of “Chapter 3: Halakhic Rulings on Abortion” from Ronit Irshai, Fertility and Jewish Law: Feminist Perspectives on Orthodox Responsa Literature, trans. Joel A. Linsider (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2012). It has been revised by the editors to fit the presentation style of TheTorah, with input from the author.
Translation of Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert in Oxford Annotated Mishnah, 3.837–838.
Aristotle writes:
History of Animals 7:3 In the case of a male embryo aborted at the fortieth day, if it be placed in cold water, it holds together in a sort of membrane, but if it be placed in any other fluid, it dissolves and disappears. If the membrane be pulled to bits the embryo is revealed as big as one of the large kind of ants; and all the limbs are plain to see, including the penis, and the eyes also, which as in other animals are of great size. But the female embryo, if it suffer abortion during the first three months, is a as a rule found to be undifferentiated; if however it reach the fourth month it comes to be subdivided and quickly attains further differentiation.
English from Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Bolington Series 71.2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991 [repr. of 1984]), 1.914. This Hellenistic-medical concept, especially as presented in the Mishnah, likely connects to the parturient laws in Leviticus 12, which has a 40/80 day scheme. See Zev Farber, “Postpartum Impurity: Why Is the Duration Double for a Girl?” TheTorah (2020).
The text doesn’t specify that the fetus is older than 40 days. This is likely assumed though, as will be clear, it doesn’t really matter, practically speaking.
Translation from Jonah Steinberg in, The Oxford Annotated Mishnah, ed., Shaye J.D. Cohen, Robert Goldenberg, and Hayim Lapin (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022), 3.215.
The odd notion of an arm coming out first may be connected to the biblical story of the birth of Jacob in Genesis 25:26 Zerah in Genesis 38:28. See discussion of these texts and the reasoning behind them in Eran Viezel, “Why Does the Torah Describe Babies Born Hands First?” TheTorah (2018).
This last line is both difficult to parse and textually uncertain. The text here follows the Vienna MS, as noted by Lieberman in his Tosefet Rishonim (ad loc.) The Erfurt MS, as it appears in the Zuckermendl edition, reads שאלו ילדה את ולדותיה נסקלין, “for if she had given birth to the fetus, would it be stoned?” As for what the line phrased this way could mean, R. Yehezkel Abramsky, in his Chazon Yechezekel commentary, explains the point as follows: The law of the goring cow condemns a calf to die with its mother, even after it was born, as long as the court condemned the mother (cow) before she gave birth. The Tosefta here is noting that this is certainly not the law for humans. R. David Pardo, in his Chasdei David, also understands the point of the line this way. Nevertheless, he thinks even with this interpretation, the text as is unreadable as is. Thus, he suggests an emendation: שאילו הפרה היא וולדותיה נסקלין “for if she were a cow, its fetus would be stoned [in this scenario],” but she is human, so this doesn’t apply.
Pardo (Chasdei David, ad loc) understands the Tosefta as disagreeing with the Mishnah and holding a stricter position. In contrast, Abramsky (Chazon Yechezkel) sees the Mishnah and the Tosefta as expressing the same view.
Aramaic text follows MS Vatican 120–121 (12th/13th cent. Ashkenaz, with abbreviations filled in, punctuation added, and corrections (from the editor of The Friedberg Project) in brackets.
The passage reads:
איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל וכתיב "כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה" ממונא דבעל הוא ולא נפסדיה, קא משמע לן.
It is necessary, for otherwise, you might think that I would say that inasmuch as it is written (Exod 21:22) “according as the woman’s husband may exact from him”—[the fetus] is the husband’s property, which he should not be made to lose. Therefore, the Mishnah stated the rule [that the execution is not stayed].
It is possible the meaning here is womb or “female parts,” with thigh as a euphemism, as it may also be in the biblical law of sotah (Numbers 5:21, 27).
Ephraim Urbach notes in this regard that even though the phrase “a fetus is its mother’s thigh” is not tannaitic phrasing (or even early Amoraic), no tanna believes the fetus to be a body in its own right or considers it a “life.” See Ephraim Urbach, חז"ל: פרקי אמונות ודעות [The Sages Their Concepts and Beliefs] (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1971 [orig. 1969]), 214–218.
This comes up in the context of the Mishnah’s rule (Yoma 8:7) that “saving a life [nefesh] supersedes Shabbat.” Notably, the Mishnah is very lenient when it comes to the life of the pregnant woman:
משנה יומא ח:ה[*ד] עֹבָרָה שֶׁהֵרִיחָה, מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתָהּ עַד שֶׁתָּשִׁיב נַפְשָׁהּ. חוֹלֶה, מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי בְקִיִּים; וְאִם אֵין שָׁם בְקִיִּים, מַאֲכִילִין עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ, עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר דַּיִי.
m. Yoma 8:5[*4] If a pregnant woman smelled [food], one may feed her until she regains her energy. If someone is ill, one feeds him according to specialists, and if there are no specialists available he is fed according to his wishes until he says “Enough!” (Translation of Yonatan S. Miller from Oxford Annotated Mishnah, 1.623–624.)
The Talmud extends this permission to other halakhic violations:
בבלי יומא פב. [הספרייה הבריטית 400] תנו רבנן עברה שהריחה בשר הקודש או בשר דבר אחר תוחבין לה כוש ברוטב אם נתיישבה דעתה מוטב ואם לאו מביאין לה רוטב עצמו אם נתיישבה דעתה מוטב ואם לאו מביאין לה שומן עצמו, שאין לך דבר שעומד בפני פיקוח נפש יותר מעבודה זרה ושפיכות דמים וגילוי עריות.
b. Yoma 82a It was taught [in a baraita]: If a pregnant woman smells sacrificial meat or another (i.e. pig) meat [and is seized by a craving for it], a small stick is dipped in its gravy. If her mind comes to be at ease, good; if not, she is fed the sauce itself. If her mind comes to be at ease, good; if not, she is fed the fat of the item itself, for nothing stands in the way of protecting life except for [the prohibitions on] idolatry, incest, and bloodshed.
In sum, even a biblical prohibition is waived in a case of mortal danger to the mother but, as Ephraim Urbach (The Sages, 216) says, “there is no indication that the ‘mind’ of the fetus is taken into account.”
Moreover, the Tosafot, a 12th century French commentary on the Talmud (b. Niddah 44a–b, s.v. איהו) notes that in this case, the fetus cannot be considered part of the mother, since the mother has already died and the fetus is therefore no longer dependent on her for sustenance; it is כמונח בקופסא דמי “as one situated inside a box.”
Hebrew follows the Kaufmann MS as it appears on the AlHaTorah website.
The Jerusalem Talmud (j. Sanhedrin 26c) reads ראשו ורובו “its head and most of it,” and the Babylonian Talmud (b. Sanhedrin 72b) reads ראשו “its head.”
The discussion hinges on whether or not the baby is protected because he is a minor. In the Jerusalem Talmud, the problem is presented thus:
ירושלמי סנהדרין ח:ט גָּדוּל שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה קָטוֹן מָהוּ לְהַצִּיל אֶת הַגָּדוֹל בְנַפְשׁוֹ שֶׁלְּקָטָן. הָתִיב רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה. וְהָתַנִּינָן. יָצָא רֹאשׁוֹ וְרוּבּוֹ אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ. שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן בְּשֵׁם רַב חִסְדָּא. שַׁנְייָא הִיא תַמָּן שֶׁאֵין אַתְּ יוֹדֵעַ מִי הָרַג אֶת מִי.
j. Sanhedrin 8:9 [27c] An adult who became (i.e. was overpowered by) a minor, may the adult be saved at the expense of the minor’s life? R. Jeremiah asked: Is it not taught [in the Mishnah], “If its head or most of its body has emerged, it is not touched, for one life is not set aside for another?” R. Yossi bar Bun said in the name of R. Chisda: “That case is different, for you do not know who killed whom.”
The point is that as the mother could also be seen as killing the child, they are both pursuers and there is no way to judge. The Babylonian Talmud presents it a little differently:
בבלי סנהדרין עב: [מינכין 95] אמר רב הונא: "קטן הרודף ניתן להצי[לו] בנפשו." קסבר רודף אינו צריך התראה, לא שנא גדול ולא שנא קטן. איתיביה רב חסדא לרב הונא: "'יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו לפי שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש.' ואמאי? רודף הוא!" "שאני התם דמשמיא קרדפי לה."
b. Sanhedrin 72b Rav Huna said: “A minor in pursuit may be stopped at the expense of his life.” Thus he maintains that a rodef, whether an adult or a minor, need not be formally admonished. Rav Chisda challenged Rav Huna [from the Mishnah]: “‘If its head has emerged, it is not to be touched, for one life is not set aside for another.’ But why should that be? [The fetus] is a rodef!” “No, that case is different because she is pursued by [decree of] Heaven.”
See how R. Ezekiel Landau in the Noda Bi-Yehuda (Mahadura Tenina, Hoshen Mishpat 60) understands their dispute as pertaining to the essence of the law of rodef. Noam Zohar argues that the moral basis for the law of rodef lies primarily in the attacker’s guilt. Accordingly, a minor, a small child, and certainly a fetus that unknowingly endangers another cannot be regarded as a rodef. See Noam Zohar “הלכה, פוליטיקה וחידוש התורה” [Halakha, Politics, and Renewal of Torah], in הציונות הדתית בראיה מחודשת [Religious Zionism in New Perspective], ed. Moshe Roth (Ein Tzurim: Ne’emanei Torah Ve-Avodah, 1998), 203–2010.
In his Tosefta KePeshutta commentary, Lieberman notes that, unlike in the previous case, this does not say the person was a doctor, and thus argues that the Tosefta wants to emphasize that a non-medical person in a crisis needs permission to operate, and then is treated the same as a doctor who is operating.
What I am discussing in this article is the rule for Jews. In its treatment of Noachide (gentile) law, the Talmud takes a very strict position, arguing that abortion is forbidden and even a death penalty offense:
בבלי סנהדרין נז: [מינכן 95] אשכח ר' יעקב בר אחא דהוה כתיב בספר אגדתא דבי רב בן נח נהרג בדיין אחד ובעד אחד ושלא בהתראה מפי איש ולא מפי אשה ואפילו מפי קרוב משום ר' ישמעאל אמרו אף על העוברין.
b. Sanherin 57b Rav Jacob bar Acha found written in a book of aggadah in Rav’s study hall: “A Noahide may be sentenced to death by a single judge, on the basis of [testimony by] a single witness, without admonition, on the basis of [testimony by] a man but not by a woman, but even [by a witness who is] a relative. It was said in the name of Rabbi Ishmael: Even for [killing] fetuses ….
מאי טעמא דר' ישמעאל דכתיב: 'שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך'. איזהו אדם שהוא באדם? הוי או זה העובר שבמעי אמו.
What is Rabbi Ishmael’s reason? For it is written (Gen. 9:6), “Whoever sheds the blood of man by (or “in”) a man shall his blood be shed”—Who is a man in a man? A fetus in its mother’s womb….
The disagreement between Rabbi Ishmael and the unnamed first tanna pertains to whether a Noahide is put to death for feticide, distinguishing them in that regard from Jews.[19] This seems to contradict the principle only a few pages later:
בבלי סנהדרין נט. ליכא מידעם דלישראל לישרי ולגוי אסור.
b. Sanhedrin 59a There is nothing that is permissible for a Jew but forbidden for a gentile.
The maxim is not easily reconciled with various prohibitions applied to gentiles but not to Jews, its veiled premise is that the various prohibitions imposed by the commandments are designed to elevate a person spiritually and that it is Jews who are meant to attain that higher spiritual plane. Rabbi Ishmael takes the view that for Noahides, the prohibition on murder includes feticide, and his view thus seems to pose considerable difficulty if Jews are not likewise forbidden, at least with the same degree of severity, to abort a fetus. It seems to me, however, that the maxim of “nothing permissible” is not so much a formal ruling as a value statement about Torah laws being sufficient. Indeed, if the prohibition is so severe, why was it never conveyed to Israel directly and why was it not repeated at Sinai? It further fits with the general thrust of the Talmud to make Noahide law exceptionally strict, with death penalties for every violation, even theft of less than a penny’s worth (b. Eruvin 62a; b. Yebamot 47b; b. Abodah Zarah 71b). To declare abortion committed by a Noahide to be a capital offense does not necessarily mean that it constitutes murder; it may simply be a prohibited act of lesser degree, and according to all the sources surveyed above, not applicable to Jews.
For a discussion of what the Bible does and does not say about abortion, see Shawna Dolansky, “The Bible is Silent on Abortion, but Vocal about When Life Begins,” TheTorah (2023).
See HALOT and the Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, s.v. אָסוֹן. For a discussion of the LXX understanding of the term as “formed,” its sources in Aristotelian thinking, and how this affected the reception of this verse among the church fathers who were familiar with the Bible in Greek, see chapter 2 of Marianne J. Elsakkers, Reading Between the Lines: Old Germanic and Early Christian Views on Abortion, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Amsterdam, 2010), 373–392.
The midrash continues with a back and forth, questioning this reading then defending it:
אתה אומר כן, או אינו אלא אסון בולדות וענוש באשה? תלמוד לומר: "וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה." הא מה תלמוד לומר "לֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן"? באשה. " עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ" – בולדות.
Do you say thus? Perhaps the mortal harm is to the fetus and the fine is for the woman (i.e., causing her harm)? The verse teaches you (Exod 21:23), “if there is mortal harm.” So what does [the previous verse] mean by “there is no mortal harm”? [It must be referring] to the woman. “He shall surely be fine”—for the fetus.
Moshe Halbertal (מהפכות פרשניות בהתהוותן: ערכים כשיקולים פרשניים במדרשי הלכה [Interpretive Revolutions in the Making: Values as Interpretive Considerations in Midrashei Halakhah] [Jerusalem: Magnes, 1997]) has noted that many halakhic midrashim follow a schema in which two interpretive possibilities are presented and the Midrash decides in favor of one of them. This overall model suggests that the Midrash exercises choice, usually between two possible interpretations, and consciously takes moral considerations into account.
The text here is reconstructed from the later medieval Midrash HaGadol collection, which made use of the Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. The original text for this section is lost.