The Hated Wife

Hate in ancient Near Eastern law, the Torah, and Elephantine ketubot is a legal term. If a man demotes his wife to second in rank for no fault, merely because he “hates” her, he cannot also take away her firstborn son’s right to inherit a double portion.

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The Hated Wife

Head of an Arab Girl (adapted), Miner Kilbourne Kellogg, 1814-1889. Smithsonian American Art Museum

Categories:

Ki Teitzei

Published: September 10, 2024

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Last Updated: September 7, 2026

  1. Raymond Westbrook, “The Prohibition on Restoration of Marriage in Deuteronomy 24:1-4,” in Studies in Bible 1986, ed Sarah Japhet, ScrHier 31 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1986) 387–405; and Deborah L. Ellens, Women in the Sex Texts of Leviticus and Deuteronomy: A Comparative Conceptual Analysis, LHBOTS 458 (London: T & T Clark, 2008), 235–248.

  2. The first husband cannot remarry her, since she has been married to another man in the meantime.

  3. For a discussion of what this might mean and how it has been interpreted, see Eve Levavi Feinstein, “When Is a Man Allowed to Divorce His Wife?” TheTorah (2018).

  4. The consequences for each were different. A husband who divorced his wife without grounds gave up his right to retain his wife’s dowry within his assets. A husband who could divorce his wife for cause kept the dowry and typically sent the wife away with nothing. See Westbrook, “The Prohibition on Restoration of Marriage,” 401–404.

  5. She was formerly handmaiden of Meshullam father of Zaccur. When the latter inherited his father’s estate, he decided to relinquish his hold on Jehoishma, and thus the contract is between Ananiah, who is the groom, and Zaccur, in place of Jehoishma’s natural father who was no longer her legal guardian.

  6. Text and translation are both from Zvi Henri Szubin and Bezalel Porten, “The Status of a Repudiated Spouse: A New Interpretation of Kraeling 7 (TAD B3.8),” Israel Law Review 35 (2001): 46–78 [48–51], which some adjustments. The contract assumes that both spouses have equal power in ending or redefining the marriage, which differs from rabbinic Jewish law, which gives only the husband this power. Throughout ancient Near Eastern history, both spouses were, in theory, allowed to initiate a divorce, though severe punishments for the wife, should she do so, were sometimes included in marriage contracts; see Raymond Westbrook and Bruce Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel: An Introduction (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009), 61. This text’s reference to the possibility that the wife could initiate a divorce follows this tradition.

  7. Another very similar document (Cowley 15; TAD B2.6) details the marriage of Aschur son of Tzacha, the king’s architect, to Miftachia, daughter of Machasia. It has the same provisions, though in inverse order.

  8. Alejandro F. Botta, “Hated by the Gods and Your Spouse: Legal Use of שנא in Elephantine and Its Ancient Near Eastern Context,” in Law and Religion in the Eastern Mediterranean, ed. Reinhard G. Kratz and Anselm C. Hagedorn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 105–128. He applies this reasoning to uses of ש.נ.א in the Bible as well. To my mind, whether Botta is right about the Elephantine material remains an open question. As for biblical texts, Botta’s conclusion is too broad and does not pay sufficient attention to the unique features of each situation.

  9. Szubin and Porten, “The Status of a Repudiated Spouse,” 61.

  10. See Shalom Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant in the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 56; and Bruce Wells, “First Wives Club: Divorce, Demotion, and the Fate of Leah in Genesis 29,” Maarav 18 (2011): 101–129, here 106.

  11. The text is published in Cornelia Wunsch, Urkunden zum Ehe-, Vermögens- und Erbrecht aus verschiedenen neubabylonischen Archiven, Babylonische Archive 2 (Dresden: ISLET, 2003), no. 5.

  12. Just as a woman could be divorced either with grounds or without grounds, a woman could be demoted either with grounds or without grounds. The Laws of Hammurabi, especially LH §141, indicate that a man could demote his wife with grounds—on account of her misconduct. The Babylonian contract cited above, as well as other records, confirms the husband’s right to demote without grounds.  A few records indicate that a man who so demotes a wife must give up the wife completely: her family comes and retrieves her from his household. See, e.g., the Nuzi text HSS 19 84. For a more detailed examination of these texts, see Wells, “First Wives Club,” 106–112.

  13. The typical expectation was that, if only one of two wives produced sons, it was the fertile wife who would be the first-ranking wife. See Bruce Wells, “First Wives Club,” 112–114.

  14. While this sounds like it’s just about fairness to the son and not a penalty for demoting the wife, I take this line to mean that the oldest son typically has the right of the firstborn because he is the first of his father’s virility. But because there is plenty of evidence of younger sons being promoted to firstborn status—in the ANE, Judah in J, Joseph in E, Isaac, etc.—it is hard to believe that this law is trying to overturn all of that precedent. Instead, the strict adherence to fairness here, forgoing the father’s option to choose a different heir as firstborn, only applies when a man has a loved and hated wife.  

  15. Eryl W. Davies, “The Inheritance of the Firstborn in Israel and the Ancient Near East,” JSS 38 (1993): 175–191. If he has only two sons, the man in Deuteronomy 21:15–17 would give two thirds of his estate to the older son and one third to the younger.

  16. Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in vol. 1 of A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, ed. Raymond Westbrook, HdO 72 (Leiden: Brill 2003), 1–90 [pp. 57–60]. Fathers could not, however, completely disinherit a son without grounds; see Laws of Hammurabi §§168–169.

  17. The text is HSS 9 24 and dates to the Late Bronze Age (1550–1200 BCE). For an edition, see Jonathan Paradise, “Nuzi Inheritance Practice,” Ph.D. diss. (University of Pennsylvania, 1972), 260.

  18. Isaac Mendelsohn, “On the Preferential Status of the Eldest Son,” BASOR 156 (Dec. 1959): 38–40, here 38.

  19. Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “Israel,” in vol. 2 of A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, ed. R. Westbrook, HdO 72 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 975–1046 [p. 1018].

  20. Westbrook, “The Prohibition on Restoration of Marriage,” 401–404. Ordinarily, husbands were allowed to use their wives’ dowries and profit from them throughout the marriage.

  21. In a similar vein, we see the word “love” used to refer to the primary heir in an Ugaritic text (RS 94.2168), which records a grant of houses and fields that a certain ‘Abdimilku received from the king of Ugarit. The text describes the one who will be ‘Abdimilku’s primary heir and the one to receive much of the granted property as “the one among his sons whom ‘Abdimilku loves” (lines 11-12: d . hb . ‘bdmlk / b . bnh). See Pierre Bordreuil and Dennis Pardee, Manuel d’Ougaritique (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 2004), vol. 2, 105–106.