Torah scrolls in the ark at Leiden Synagogue, Netherlands. Above them is a quote from Psalm 19:8, “The torah of the LORD is perfect, renewing life.” Marie, Flickr cc 2.0
Can We Pass Moral Judgment on Torah?
I don’t defend the Torah’s ostensibly immoral laws, but I do try to understand what motivated them.
Published: November 25, 2022
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Last Updated: September 7, 2026
To be clear, I am not a scholar of the ancient Near East. My point is not to offer legal precedents or learned cultural comparisons. My point in this essay is that we should try our best to imagine what could be the motivating factor behind the legislation, thinking about how different life-experiences can lead people to very different evaluations as to what is ethical. Thus, in this presentation, it is not the specific explanations I offer that are important, but the general approach.
My hard-souled neighbors would prefer keeping immigrants out altogether, while my soft-souled neighbors also want to keep refugee numbers down to some manageable number. While this feels like an important difference to many of us, from the refugees’ viewpoint, both groups would calmly acquiesce to the destruction of the bulk of their population.
In our times, some governments oppress subgroups of their own populations, and the international community rightfully condemns this treatment: the Chinese treatment of Uighurs and the Burmese of Rohingya, for example. When the oppressed people escape to other countries, though, they become refugees. The governments and inhabitants of those countries might have obligations under international treaties to accept refugees, but the governments usually have strict limits on accepting refugees in practice. If the governments bar refugees entirely, or sequester them in camps, international opinion more or less accepts that policy. The European countries seek ways to prevent Asian and African refugees from reaching their borders. If the refugees drown in the sea, the target countries do not suffer much condemnation. Countries earn applause if they accept a few refugees.
I am writing this reflection in a way that treats the law as something that was carried out. Many academic scholars have argued that the law is a fantasy, a backwards reflection of a later Israelite author. See, e.g., Gili Kugler, “Joshua’s Conquest: A Cultural and Pedagogical Dilemma in Modern Israel,” TheTorah (2021); Mordechai Cogan, “Deuteronomy’s Herem Law: Protecting Israel at the Cost of its Humanity,” TheTorah (2022).
As Zev Farber points out in his “Can the Torah Be a Moral Authority in Modern Times?” (TheTorah 2021), and thus, “we preserve the law, at least as an ideal.” See also Norman Solomon, “Relating Truthfully to Morally Problematic Torah Texts,” TheTorah (2017). See also a parallel presentation in Aryeh Klapper, “Should Moral Intuition and Halakhah always Agree?” Modern Torah Leadership (2019).
This question lies at the heart of Nolan Finley and Stephen Henderson’s Civility Project. See my, “Let’s Be Civil: Talking and Listening Across the Political Divide,” Detroit Jewish News (May 30, 2022).
In Roman law, this was called ius vitae necisque podestas, Latin for “the Law of the power over life and death.” Whether this really was Roman law, or whether fathers were actually required to take the child to a magistrate first, is debated by historians. See discussion in, John Curran, “Ius Vitae Necisque: The politics of Killing Children,” Journal of Ancient History 6.1 (2018): 111–135.
See discussion in, Rami Arav, “Do Biblical Laws Reflect a Tribal Society?” TheTorah (2019); Yigal Bloch, “Blood Vengeance in Ancient Near Eastern Context,” TheTorah (2022).
For how the Torah modifies that its laws to include but also to hamper blood vengeance, see Itamar Kislev, “Revising the Laws of Murder to Accommodate Blood Vengeance,” TheTorah (2022).
Just as one example, see this story from an article in India Today (Feb 9, 2022):
“Last week, a man killed his married sister who was gang-raped in the Sargodha district, some 200 kilometers from Lahore. The 28-year-old victim, a mother of five children, was raped by four suspects in a neighbourhood where she worked as domestic help. The alleged killer told the police that he shot dead his sister for dishonouring the family honour.”
The author of the article notes: “Over 2,400 women raped, 90 killed in name of 'family honour' in Pakistan's Punjab province in 6 months.”
The Vilna text as עובדי כוכבים “pagans” [literally “star worshippers”], but this was an adjustment based on the censor, so as not to state explicitly that the text is suggesting that Jews should cart blanche abandon gentiles in wells if they have the opportunity. (Every manuscript and both of the other printings say “gentiles.”)
Hebrew text from MS JTS 15. The word heretics also appears in MS Paris 1337.
A baraita, literally “an outside source,” is a tannaitic source not included in the Mishnah.
Dr. Nava Finkelman, my daughter-in-law, points out that Israeli law does require bystanders to intervene.
See b. Sanhedrin 25b, 26b; Leviticus Rabbah 3:4.
As noted, some textual variants extend the prohibition to heretics, i.e., people who reject the faith tenets of Judaism. This does not appear to be the original text and is much harder to understand, but it did enter halakhic discourse. Attempting to explain—not defend—it, I would note that if societal order depends on universal agreement about the underpinnings of civil relations, then whoever added this group to the list may have thought that eliminating such groups was necessary to maintain societal order. Of course, we have learned, in our long experience, that people can become good neighbors even while having radically different theories for why they should remain good neighbors. The heroes of Albert Camus’ novel The Plague, a Catholic priest and a secular doctor, work together to care for an endangered community during a deadly epidemic, illustrate this truth well, but maybe our ancestors did not have that experience.
The same text is found in Lamentations Rabbah 4:2.
My effort here to contextualize problematic texts has a history. For example, Moses Maimonides, in The Guide of the Perplexed (3:32), sees the entire practice of sacrifices as problematic, and explains that their inclusion in Torah law was a concession, to wean them away from idolatry. At that point in history, people could not understand simply doing without sacrifices, so the Torah limits the place where sacrifices can be offered, the people who may perform the sacrifice, and the times when sacrifices may be offered. Rabbi Nathan Lopes-Cardozo, “The Deliberately Flawed Divine Torah,” TheTorah (2016), expands this effort to other commandments. See also chapter 27 of, Nathan Lopes-Cardozo, Jewish Law as Rebellion: A Plea for Religious Authenticity and Halachic Courage (2018).
Attributed to him by John Emerich Edward, known as Lord Acton (1834–1902), in a June 1895 lecture at Cambridge and published in Lectures in Modern History (London: MacMillan and comp., 1906).
Graham Green, The Power and the Glory (Great Britain: Heinemann, 1940), 131.