Post-Liberalism and "As If" Beliefs

  For a summary of some sample views, see Michael Scott, “Wittgenstein and Realism”, in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 2, April 2000, pp. 170-190.

  For a concise defense of this position with regard to interpretations of Wittgenstein, see Jacob Joshua Ross, “Religious Truth and Realism in Wittgenstein and the Wittgenstinians”, Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy: A Reassessment after 50 Years – Papers of the 24^thInternational Wittgenstein Symposium, vol. IX (2) (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2001), pp. 254-257.

 For two notable precursors of this trend, now better known as “constructivism”, see Jeremy Bentham, “Theory of Fictions”, in Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, compiled and edited by C.K. Ogden, [London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1932]) and Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of As-If: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind, translated by C.K. Ogden [London: K. Paul, Trench & Co., 1924]).  The latter work, which offers one of the earliest and most comprehensive expositions of the importance of “useful fictions” – i.e., beliefs that we know are not true but still come in handy – suggests that ultimate truth would always be beyond us. Nevertheless, for practical purposes, we need to create partial truths and act “as if” they were true if they are beneficial to us. More radical and contemporary extensions of this view, as represented by Continental postmodern philosophers such as Jean Boudrillard (1929-2007), or in the more recent work of Anglican philosopher and theologian, Rev. Don Cupitt, reject all distinction between reality and its representation, contending that there is no truth beyond language and the depictions that we construct.  

 For a similar formulation of this contrast, see Solomon (ibid),, p. 314-315

  For a similar view, see the essay of Eliezer (Louis) Finkelman on TheTorah.com, especially part 2, “Torah from Heaven: A Question of Evidence or Loyalty”.

 For formulation of this suggestion and lively discussion of related topics, visit the website of the Association for the Philosophy of Judaism: http://philosophyofjudaism.blogspot.com/ and particularly the symposia entitled Wettstein’s “Doctrine”/ “Theological Impressionism”; “Religious Belief, Make-Believe, and Science; Foundational Questions for the Study of Judaism”; “Evidence and Exodus.”  It should be noted, however, that while Lebens appears on this site as a sympathetic exponent of the “as if” approach, he nevertheless deems it necessary to ground religious commitment on a thoroughly realist understanding of some key classical beliefs about God and revelation, which would allow viewing the canonical make-believe attitudes of Judaism as divinely ordained – see Lebens, “The Epistemology of Religiosity: An Orthodox Jewish perspective”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74:3 (2013) pp. 315-332 .  (I thank Lebens for this clarification). This, of course, places Lebens on a playing field similar to that of Kugel, still begging the unresolved epistemological and philosophical questions of this stance, and shared by Rosenzweig and other Buberian forbearers.