Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik: Questioning the Centrality of Empirical Data

See, for example, Marc B. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised(Oxford: Littman, 2004); Menachem Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything (Oxford: Littman, 2006); Howard Wettstein, “Doctrine”, in Faith and Philosophy vol. 14:4 (October 1997), pp. 423-443.

See, for example, Eliezer Berkovits’ “What is Jewish Philosophy?” in Tradition, vol.3:2 (Spring, 1961), pp. 117-130, where he asserts that the Torah, as the word of God, is “a fact, a historic event that happened between God and Israel” (p. 121). Since the revelation at Sinai “occurred in history at a definite moment and at a definite place”, the Torah – along with God and Israel – is one of three “events” constituting the constants of Jewish belief (ibid).

Such rejection is not to be equated with recent willingness on the part of a few Orthodox thinkers to push the envelope of non-Mosaic authorship to its limits. These thinkers cite various Talmudic and medieval sources that already allowed for the possibility of later interpolations to the original Torah text, while generally acknowledging a qualitative difference between such isolated cases and the conclusions of more radical source theory. See, for example, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow’s piece on TheTorah.com, as well as the essay by Prof. Israel Knohl(written in his pre-academic days). See also Prof. Marc Shapiro’s essay on the Seforim blog, analyzing the position of Cherlow, Knohl and others who concede the dispensability of Mosaic authorship on the basis of such precedents, so long as the more extended interpolations may also be regarded as prophetically inspired or formally incorporated into the canon by the Talmudic Sages).

As important as this contribution is, it is not what I am discussing in this section. The discussion in this section of deviations from cognitivism is not meant to refer to any type of rational claim but rather to a variety of religious existentialism in tune with the earlier Wittgenstein’s distinction (see excursus) between cognitive (“meaningful”) and non-cognitive (“nonsensical”) propositions, which justifies the latter as pointers to ineffable truths that cannot be validated empirically.

J.B. Soloveitchik, “The Lonely Man of Faith”, edited by David Shatz (New York: Doubleday, 1992), p. 10.

Breuer – like Soloveitchik in this passage – was aware of the findings of source criticism and even developed a full-blown theory for explaining them as the divine method for conveying timeless existential truths in a dialectical manner. He, however, insisted upon basing the authority of the Torah on the fact that the Mosaic prophecy was unique in its level of reliability.

Alan Brill, on his blogsite: The Book of Doctrines and Opinions: Notes on Jewish Theology and Spirituality ) transcribes the relevant section of an earlier lecture of Soloveitchik which he regards as “the emergence, if not the origin” of “The Lonely Man of Faith” essay. In this lecture, Soloveitchik refers to Umberto Cassuto, stating:

“As you know, Bible critics already pointed out these two accounts as differing. The Bible critics always claim two sources. The Bible critics, they make one mistake: they don’t try to solve the problem philosophically. [Umberto] Casutto says they substituted source criticism for philosophic ideas. [AB- Cassuto, Genesis, before the second account of creation.] I tell you this not because I am a rabbi and am dedicated to this text, and not because of fundamentalism. I like to understand the text. Even if you want to accept the Bible critics… I am not interested in the source, [but] rather the literary structure for the two accounts. The story is not something arbitrary. The story of bringing Eve was intended to show that one account is not sufficient. The two theses are contradictory and Judaism accepts both: man created alone and together. There are two theories about society: the individual and the communal, Robinson Crusoe and the Hegel corporal state.”

Although this transcription is interesting, Soloveitchik’s actual opinion regarding the literary origins of the two conflicting accounts remains unresolved.

In this Soloveitchik differs even from the earlier Wittgensteinian position. For a current application of Soloveitchik’s approach, see Rabbi Yosef Kanefsky’s blog post, “I have not been troubled by them,” on Morethodoxy,http://morethodoxy.org/2013/08/09/i-have-not-been-troubled-by-them-another-angle-on-the-question-de-jure-by-yosef-kanefsky/.

See, for example, Joseph Dov Halevi Soloveitchik, “U-vikashtem mi-sham”, Ish ha-Halakhah – Galui ve Nistar(Jerusalem: Dept. of Religious Culture and Education for the Golah, 1979), pp. 127-137.

See, his essay, “Halakhic Man”, in Ish ha-Halakha, pp. 56-59.